CHAPTER I

NAVAL AVIATION 1898-1917

            Early aviation experiments established a pattern of mistrust within the Navy which made adoption of the new technology a difficult proposition for the conservative institution.  From Samuel Peirpont Langley’s failed experiments through the tragedy of the Wright brothers demonstration for the military, aviation developed a reputation among naval officers of being an unreliable, perhaps even unfeasible, technology with little or no application to naval warfare.  This perception left the United States lagging far behind foreign navies in its development of aviation and only entry into the First World War brought naval aviation out of the largely experimental stage. 

            “Colonel [Theodore] Roosevelt will, I think, assure you that I am not a crank and I have no desire to ‘Rush in where angels fear to tread’....”[1]  So began a letter from an erstwhile aviation supporter to the Secretary of the Navy in 1924.  The letter is characteristic of many such letters supporting naval aviation received by the Secretary of the Navy’s office.  It also demonstrates the writers obvious understanding of the Navy’s perception of such individuals.  The first such letter reached the Secretary of the Navy before the Spanish American War and was written by another Roosevelt, the future president of the United States.

On the verge of war with Spain in 1898, then Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt sent a memo to his superior, Secretary John D. Long, recommending the Navy support the experiments of Samuel Peirpont Langley.  Langley was already a noted scientist for his development of the bolometer, an ultra sensitive thermometer used in measuring the sun’s heat, and as Secretary of the Smithsonian Institute. He had developed, and flown, a model, steam powered, aerodrome, Langley’s name for all his flying machines, in 1896 and now sought additional funding for further tests including a full scale version of the model aerodrome.[2]

            To facilitate and authenticate the results of Langley’s experiments, Roosevelt proposed the creation of a board of officers, both Army and Navy, headed by the director of the Naval Observatory, Commander Charles H. Davis.  Termed the Langley Board, when convened, it consisted of Davis and Stimson J. Brown, Professor of Mathematics at the Naval Academy, representing the Navy, with Colonel G. W. Davis,  Major Robert Craig, and Captain William Crozier, representing the Army.  Soliciting testimony and advice from some of the top scientific minds of the time, such as Alexander Graham Bell and Hiram Maxim, the board concluded that the creation of a machine capable of heavier than air flight was feasible in the near future.  Further, it concluded that such a machine could be of military value in reconnaissance, communications, and assault, by dropping explosives on an enemy.  The Board also noted European interest in aviation and Langley’s willingness to forego patents in the interest of furthering aviation. Langley’s estimate that $50,000 was needed for the project was not challenged, and the board recommended that such an amount be appropriated.[3]

            Despite the Langley Board’s report, the Navy’s Board of Construction concluded that the machine would not be of use to the service, and thus the Navy chose not to contribute to the funding of Langley’s experiments.  The Army’s Board of Ordnance and Fortifications spent $50,000 over two years, and Langley managed to obtain another $25,000 from private sources to support the experiment.  Assisted by Charles M. Manly, whose talent some critics allege Langley obscured, Langley constructed a forty-eight foot, seventy-three hundred pound model on a house boat anchored on the Potomac River south of Washington, DC.  There, in October 1903, he conducted a monumental demonstration of his machine before a body of reporters.  With Manly at the controls the machine “was launched into the air and landed in the water.”  In a second attempt on 8 December 1903, the aerodrome broke in half on impact with the water, completely destroying the device.[4]

            The two public failures provided ready fodder for newspapers throughout the country.  Ridicule soon turned more serious as members of Congress began to question the government’s support of Langley’s experiments.  Representative J. M. Robinson(D-IN) unleashed a barrage of criticism on the House floor declaring:

It has become a scandal that Langley’s airship has cost the Government over $200,000;  when it never had a grain of utility about it;  and that was under the direct charge of the Secretary of War and under the charge of war and navy officers, a board sanctioned by this Congress, which gave them at this time $3,000,000 with which to operate, and by the Fortification bill of last year gave them $100,000 of the people’s money to be wasted on this scientific aerial navigation experiment that never had any chance utility, because some man, perchance a professor, wandering in his dreams, sought to impress and did impress upon the officers who were charged with the expenditure of public money that this aerial flight scheme that was attempted had some utility.  He hypnotized them.[5]

The Navy’s decision not to fund Langley’s experiments allowed it to avoid most of this criticism and public ridicule, and reinforced the conviction of senior officers that there was no future in the technology.

            Utterly crushed by his public humiliation, Langley suffered severe depression until he died of a stroke in 1906.  Later, Glenn Curtiss, in an attempt to invalidate some of the Wright brothers’ patents, would modify Langley’s aerodrome and successfully fly it at Hammondsport, New York, setting off debate over the true “father of aviation.”  The Navy, in an ironic move considering its lack of support from 1898 to 1903, recognized Langley’s contributions by naming its first aircraft carrier after him in 1922.[6] 

            Overshadowed by the Langley debacle, the Wright brothers successfully flew their Wright Flyer at Kitty Hawk, North Carolina, on 17 December 1903, just nine days after Langley’s second failed attempt.  Press reports of the monumental accomplishment were lost in the Langley story and the Christmas holidays.  Influenced by Langley’s treatment at the hands of the press and a desire to protect their patents, the Wright brothers restricted access to future test flights.  This secrecy led some to question the validity of their achievements.[7]

            In an attempt in 1908 to gain military contracts for their aircraft, the Wright brothers arranged for a demonstration of their machine at Fort Myers, Virginia.  The demonstration, on 17 September, was attended by numerous military officials including Secretary of the Navy Victor Metcalf.  Lieutenant George C. Sweet, a Navy officer, was scheduled to fly as a passenger with Orville Wright as the pilot in the first demonstration.  Lieutenant Thomas E. Selfridge, an Army officer, replaced Sweet at the last minute.  Modifications to the plane to accommodate the larger Sweet unbalanced the aircraft and it crashed shortly after takeoff while attempting a turn, killing Selfridge and badly wounding Wright.[8] 

Sweet, undaunted by the accident and his brush with death, recommended the purchase of airplanes by the Navy.  Rear Admiral William S. Cowles, Chief of the Bureau of Equipment, approved a modified version of Sweet’s recommendation which did not mention the Fort Myers demonstration or make recommendations.  Secretary Metcalf, however, remained unwilling to risk money and lives on the obviously dangerous technology, a sentiment was echoed in Congress, which failed to provide any funding for aviation in 1909 or 1910.[9] 

            Lieutenant Sweet represented a growing group of aviation enthusiasts among the officer corps, but the Navy remained officially uninterested in aviation until September 1910 when Secretary of the Navy George Meyer designated Captain Washington Irving Chambers as the officer to whom all aviation inquiries should be forwarded.  Chambers, an Assistant to the Aid for Material, moved quickly to prevent a potential embarrassment to Navy when the Hamburg-American Company announced plans to use Curtiss test pilot J. A. D. McCurdy and a Curtiss airplane for the first ship to shore flight.  Weather and other difficulties delayed the Hamburg-American attempt and allowed Chambers to convince Navy officials to release the cruiser Birmingham for a similar experiment.  Chambers then arranged to borrow a pilot and plane from Glenn Curtiss after a similar request was flatly rejected by the Wright brothers.[10]

            Eugene Ely, the Curtiss pilot, made the attempt on 14 November 1910, to much less fanfare than the Hamburg-American attempt and prior to schedule because of concerns over the weather.  Taking off from a platform built over the ship’s forecastle while the ship was at anchor rather than underway as originally planned, Ely used the entire eighty-five feet of the ramp and then dipped perilously close to the surface of the water, dragging the plane’s wheels in the water and damaging the propeller tips.   Pulling out successfully, Ely flew to Willoughby Spit, more than two miles away, pursued by a number of launches and other boats.[11]

            Both Chambers and Ely declared the flight a success and, as the New York Times pointed out, all that remained was to complete the circuit and land a plane on a ship successfully.[12]  Chambers arranged for the cruiser Pennsylvania to serve as the receiving ship for the landing test.  With the ship anchored in San Francisco Bay, a deck was constructed over the its fantail and aft turret.  In order to stop the plane, and prevent it from crashing into the ship’s superstructure, Ely designed a crude arresting system with twenty-two ropes, each with a fifty pound bag of sand attached to each end, strung across the one hundred-twenty foot deck, and a set of hooks on the plane.  Using the same plane as in the Birmingham test, Ely took off from Tanforan Airfield and landed successfully on the Pennsylvania.  He thus demonstrated not only the ability of planes to operate successfully from ships but also established the template for the arresting gear which would be used throughout naval aviation.[13]

            Two other events in this period further solidified aviation in the future U.S. Navy.  First, on 29 November 1910, a little over two weeks after Ely’s successful flight from the Birmingham, Curtiss wrote the Secretary of the Navy and offered to train a naval officer to fly his plane at no cost to the Navy.  The Navy ordered Lieutenant Theodore G. Ellyson to report to Curtiss’ training base at North Island near San Diego on 23 December 1910.  Ellyson would become Naval Aviator No. 1.[14] 

            Second, in January 1911, Curtiss added another dimension to naval aviation when he became the first American to successfully take off from water using a hydroaeroplane, i.e., a float plane, of his own design.  He demonstrated the military ramifications of this design in February 1911, when cranes on the Pennsylvania lifted his hydroaeroplane out of the water and onto the ship, and then returned it to the water so that it could takeoff again.  While Ely had shown that the airplane could take off and land on a ship, Curtiss now showed that it might not even be necessary as the airplane might be able to make the ocean its home.[15]

            The events from November 1910 to February 1911 constituted an amazing triumph for aviation, the U.S. Navy, Glenn Curtiss, and especially Captain Chambers.  In only a few months, their combined efforts had established two world firsts:  the first takeoff from a ship and the first landing on a ship;  and two additional American firsts:  the first takeoff from water, and the first landing on water.  In addition, aviation now had an official presence in the Navy, in the person of Captain Chambers, and the first naval aviator, Lieutenant Ellyson. 

For a service which had emphatically rejected the new technology just two years before, the Navy now boasted a remarkable record of achievement;  a record made even more impressive since the Navy as yet did not even own a single plane and had not requested any money for aviation up to this point.  Therefore, credit for the Navy’s success lies with Captain Chambers, who had managed to accomplish all of this without any official authority within the Navy and without a budget.  Chambers had availed himself on the good will of Curtiss to achieve these goals, but would soon find additional support within the Navy and without.

            On 1 April 1911, Captain Chambers reported for duty with the General Board, a move suggested by the Board’s senior member, Admiral George Dewey, a strong aviation supporter.  The General Board had been established in 1900 to provide war and other long term planning for the Navy.  Over time the General Board became the principal policy making body of the Navy, even though it lacked official authority to do anything more than advise.  Chambers’ transfer to this body elevated aviation’s exposure within the Navy and gave its chief proponent access to many of the service’s senior officers.  The Board, which had rejected aviation as early as 1907, now seemed much more supportive of the technology.[16]

            Chambers’ assignment to the General Board turned out to be temporary as he, and the aviation desk, were transferred to the Bureau of Navigation just two weeks later, on 14 April 1911, despite the protests of Admiral Dewey.  Established in 1842 to replace the Board of Naval Commissioners, the Navy’s bureau system constituted the service’s primary bureaucratic structure.  The eight bureaus each controlled, or in Navy terminology had cognizance over, different aspects of the Navy, the Bureau of Steam over engines, the Bureau of Yards and Docks over shore facilities, etc.[17] 

Each bureau constituted a virtual fiefdom, with the bureau chief responsible only to the Secretary of the Navy.  Transfer of aviation to the Bureau of Navigation, the bureau normally assigned miscellaneous or experimental work outside the purview of the other bureaus, should have improved aviation’s position within the service in terms of competing for funds.  Unfortunately, the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, Rear Admiral Reginald F. Nelson, saw little future in the new technology and even suggested that Chambers perform his duties at home so that he would not occupy valuable office space.  Instead, for three years, Chambers occupied the most undesirable office in the Bureau, under the stairs.[18]

            Congress provided the first funds for naval aviation on 4 March 1911, appropriating $25,000 to the Bureau of Navigation for experimental work.  Five days later, the Wright Company offered to train a Navy officer if the service would agree to purchase a plane from the company.  The qualifier was soon dropped and Lieutenant John Rodgers reported to Dayton, Ohio, on 17 March to become Naval Aviator No. 2.  This willingness by Curtiss and Wright to train pilots for the Navy without compensation resulted not only from their sincere desire to promote aviation but also from more selfish reasons.  Each company had developed different sets of controls and even control surfaces, the Wrights using a wing warping technique while Curtiss developed the precursor to the modern day aileron, so that a pilot trained to fly one could not necessarily fly the other.  Hence, each company realized that the more officers trained in flying its planes the more likely it would be that its planes would be purchased by the Navy.[19]

            Chambers prepared the necessary paperwork for procuring the Navy’s first aircraft in May 1911, but failed to obtain the signatures necessary to make the contracts legal.  Still, because the first steps had been taken to procure aircraft for the Navy and the necessary signatures would soon be acquired, 8 May 1911 became the date officially recognized as the birthday of naval aviation.  In June, Lieutenant(jg) John H. Towers reported to the Curtiss School at Hammondsport, New York, to become Naval Aviator No. 3.  In July the Navy took delivery of its first aircraft, two from Curtiss and one from Wright, numbers identical to the Navy pilots trained by companies.[20]  

            The planes were purchased as proprietary items much like ship’s boats, meaning that these companies were the only ones who could supply them and hence avoiding a competitive bidding process.  Continually bombarded with amateur proposals to supply the Navy with aircraft, Chambers wanted to avoid a competitive bidding process which would force the Navy to accept the lowest bid even though that company might not be able to supply the aircraft once it had won the contract.  He based his fear on the Army’s experience with purchasing its first airplanes in 1908.[21] 

In response to Specification No. 486, the Army received forty-one proposals, twenty-two of which were considered.  Because the Army required a ten percent cash bond with the proposal, prices for a single plane ranged from $850 to $1,000,000 depending not only on the inventors true estimate of cost but also on the amount of money each was willing or able to gamble on the project.  The legal constrictions of competitive bidding forced the Army to award contracts to three different companies, including the Wright brothers, with only the Wrights completing the contract.  By using the expedient of a proprietary item Chambers awarded the contracts to the only two companies he felt were capable of fulfilling them, Curtiss and Wright.[22]

            The Wright aircraft, designated B-1, was a standard Wright pusher design configured for land use.  A single sixty horsepower engine drove the two pusher propellers, leaving the machine under-powered. The Navy procured two more airplanes of similar design, designated B-2 and B-3, by 1913. The Navy converted all of the machines to hydroaeroplanes during their service life.  None of the Wright machines proved exemplary in service.  According to Chambers, B-2’s performance improved after it was fitted with a Curtiss engine but the plane crashed shortly afterwards and parts were used in the construction of B-3.[23]

            The two Curtiss aircraft received the designations A-1 and A-2, the first being a hydroaeroplane and the second a land plane.  Each was fitted with a fifty horsepower engine driving a single pusher propeller.  The A-1, nicknamed the Triad, was converted to an amphibian with the addition of retractable wheels so that the plane could be used from either land or water.  Ellyson tested the A-1 at Hammondsport, riding on a pontoon with Curtiss at the controls for his first flight.  Later, on 3 July 1911, Ellyson used the plane to make the first night flight of a naval aviator.[24]

            With planes and pilots secured, Chambers next moved to organize an experimental station to house them.  Greenbury Point, Annapolis, was selected for the station and Chambers reported for temporary duty at the Naval Academy in July 1911.  Chambers later described the site “...on the north shore of the Severn River, near the Engineering Experiment Station, where the machines are housed in, Navy made, transportable tents.”[25]  This makeshift arrangement was soon replaced by a plane “shed” capable of accommodating three aircraft.  The Navy also constructed an additional building which house the officer quarters, barracks for the enlisted men, and a workshop.[26]

The officers assigned to flight duty with Curtiss and Wright were ordered to the new site in August.  There they began a series of experiments which culminated in a one hundred-twelve mile flight by Ellyson and Towers on 25 October 1911.  Originally the officers intended to fly from Annapolis to Fort Monroe, Virginia, but they were forced down with engine problems near Milford Haven, Virginia.  Still, the flight represented another new record for the Navy and demonstrated the plane’s ability to do more than simply fly around a fixed point.  Later, using rowboats and buckets of gasoline set on fire to mark the way, they would demonstrate the feasibility of night landings on the Severn River.[27]

            The year concluded with a number of other important events.  In November, Ensign Victor D. Herbster began flight instruction at Annapolis, becoming not only Naval Aviator No. 4, but also the first pilot to be trained by the Navy rather than a private organization or individual.  Later that month the Navy began converting the Wright B-1 to a hydroaeroplane configuration, establishing a trend in the service towards sea planes rather than land planes.  In December unsuccessful experiments with wireless, or radio, were conducted in an effort to increase the airplane’s use in artillery spotting and reconnaissance.  At the end of the month the entire camp was transferred to North Island, San Diego, for the winter, with a base being established on land donated by Glenn Curtiss.[28]

            Naval aviation began 1911 establishing world records and important firsts without the Navy possessing even a single plane or pilot.  By the end of the year, the Navy had three planes, four pilots, and two temporary bases.  The Navy formed a close relationship with Glenn Curtiss and his Curtiss Aircraft Company.  Curtiss supplied two of the three airplanes, trained two of the four pilots, provided the land for one of the two aviation bases.  In addition, naval aviation had sparked considerable interest among the press and public, as had aviation in general.  While still in the experimental stage, no longer would aviation be rejected outright by the service.  Instead the Navy sought to develop uses for and experience with the new technology within the Navy’s doctrine and structure.

            In contrast to 1911, 1912 turned out to be relatively uneventful though it was not without developments.  Despite limited funding, the Navy added three more planes to its inventory, two from Curtiss and one from Wright.  Officers at Greenbury Point assembled a modified Wright hydroaeroplane, designated B-2, in July, fitting it with a Curtiss hydroplane and engine.  Curtiss delivered the A-3 in October, a model based on his previous designs, and in December the Navy accepted his flying boat, the first of the type to see service with the Navy.  While the Secretary of the Navy optimistically published “Requirements for Hydroaeroplanes,” the Navy was largely tied to the two established aviation companies with little control over aircraft development.  Purchasing only three aircraft a year did little to alleviate this dependence or to encourage significant development of aircraft or the industry.[29]

            Testing formed the bulk of the Navy’s work during this year.  Rogers, Ellyson and Towers participated in endurance, altitude, and climbing tests, with Rogers setting a naval altitude record of 2,103 feet in June, Ellyson a naval climb to altitude record that same month, and Towers a world endurance record of more than six hours in October.  Ellyson oversaw further experiments with airplane launchings that led to a crude form of the catapult using a destroyer torpedo tube, the first aircraft to be launched in such a fashion.  Rodgers piloted the B-1 in experiments which confirmed the plane’s ability to transmit radio messages to friendly ships, albeit at the limited distance of one mile.  Finally, Towers conducted experiments on Chesapeake Bay to determine the feasibility of spotting submarines from the air, a task he reported difficult but not impossible in the murky water.[30]

            Towers’ experiments continued in 1913 when the Navy ordered the aviation section to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to participate in fleet exercises.  These exercises proved invaluable to naval aviation not only in terms of experience but also in terms of exposure.  Aviators served as scouts, searching for mines and submarines, and experimented with bombing and aerial photography.  They also managed to take more than one hundred Navy officers up for flights safely, therefore increasing interest and confidence in the new technology.  These exercises and growing confidence in aviation by navies abroad focused new attention on aviation within the service.[31]

            On 20 July 1913, Ensign W. D. Billingsley and Towers crashed in the Wright B-2 near Greenbury Point.  Billingsley, the pilot, was thrown from the plane at high altitude and was killed;  the first naval aviator killed in a crash.  Towers managed to hold onto the plane until it hit the water and was badly wounded.  This tragedy could have seriously affected aviation’s future in the Navy had it occurred earlier, but the attention of senior officers and the Secretary of the Navy was focused on aviation developments in Europe and the growing perceived role of aviation in military plans.[32]

            In January 1913, the Navy assigned Rear Admiral Bradley A. Fiske as Aid for Operations to the Secretary of the Navy, precursor of the Chief of Naval Operations.  Fiske established himself as a strong supporter of aviation, often coming into conflict with Secretary of the Navy Josephius Daniels because of his strong views.  At the insistence of Fiske, Daniels directed the General Board to prepare a detailed report on European developments in aviation, both general and naval.[33] 

The Board’s August 1913 report began by declaring,

The available information while incomplete ... is sufficient to show with what seriousness all the leading nations of Europe have undertaken the study of aerial warfare, and with what earnestness and at what expense they have undertaken the construction of air fleets, both of the lighter and heavier than air varieties, as essential adjuncts of both Navy and Army;  and to what a lamentable degree the United States has lagged behind.[34]

The Board then proceeded to detail the current strengths, structure, and division of responsibility between army and navy for England, Germany, France, and Italy, concluding that France was the leading aviation power in the world.[35]

The Board also concluded that the United States, which had invented heavier than air flight, now lagged behind all of the major European powers in aviation.  According to the Board,

In the Navy aviation appears to be in an even more embryonic and chaotic state than in the Army.  Though the aeroplane is an American invention and the hydroplane is a distinctly American development thereof, the report of the officer in charge of aviation in the Navy give (August, 1913) as the total assets of the Navy in flying craft 4 hydroplanes and 3 flying boats, though it is proposed to buy 3 more flying boats.[36]

The Board further noted,

For organization, the Committee has been unable to find any.  An officer under the supervision of the Bureau of Navigation, with undefined duties and responsibilities and no powers, with collateral relations with the Bureaus of Construction and Repair and Steam Engineering, has a kind of general charge, and some officers volunteering are detailed for aviation duty assisted by some enlisted men.[37]

The Board summarized its findings on the necessity of aviation with an analogy suggesting that without a strong air component the Navy “would be like a blind man fighting another of equal power with all his faculties.”[38]

            To respond to this dire assessment, the Board urged that “steps should be taken at once to organize and train an efficient naval air service, including a [sic] trained personnel in sufficient numbers and both aeroplanes and dirigibles, with all the accessories for their efficient use.” To accomplish this, the report recommended the creation of an Office of Naval Aviation within Fiske’s Operations Division in the Department of the Navy.  This office, headed by at least a Captain, would be empowered to coordinate and oversee additional funds the Board hoped to obtain from Congress to support aviation.  The Board also noted that the most difficult aspect of aviation lay in training pilots, not in procuring aircraft, and recommended that the Navy focus on training rather than further experimentation.  Additionally, it recommended the Navy acquire a non-rigid dirigible for training purposes and to
gain experience with the type.  Finally, the Board noted the importance of coordination between the services and urged that steps to be taken to ensure joint action between the Army and Navy in developing aviation.[39]

            The General Board’s report proved more philosophical than physical in its impact.  While the new office was created, large increases in funding for naval aviation were not forthcoming from Congress.  The Navy made a miserable attempt to procure the non-rigid dirigible, awarding the contract to a company consisting of two lawyers and a mechanic who had once worked on a zeppelin in Germany, with no real result other than the expenditure of scarce resources.  Still, the General Board’s conclusions demonstrate the growing importance placed on aviation within the service.  Senior officers understood that aviation had developed into an important and useful tool for the fleet and that failure to keep pace with development would hinder the Navy’s effectiveness.[40]

            The most important change in the organization of naval aviation, prior to the creation of the Bureau of Aeronautics in 1921, occurred in June 1913 when General Order No. 41 divided cognizance for aviation between the bureaus of Construction and Repair, Navigation, and Steam Engineering.  Resembling the division established for ships, this restructuring assigned various aspects of the airplane to each bureau.  Construction and Repair oversaw most of the plane itself, meaning the body, the wings, control surfaces, etc.  Steam Engineering had cognizance only over the engine.  Navigation maintained cognizance over personnel, clothing, instruments, and training.[41]

            This  new organization demonstrated a number of trends within the Navy which proved both beneficial and harmful to the fledgling technology.  By establishing a system reflective of established ship procurement methods, the Navy acknowledged the growing acceptance of aviation and its long term future with the service.  By dividing cognizance, the Navy increased the number of people directly connected to aviation and also increased the number of bureaus which could include aviation expenses in their proposed budgets, thereby increasing the likelihood that aviation would receive additional funding in the future.  Unfortunately, aviation still lacked the one thing it really needed, centralized leadership and authority.  General Order No. 41 did not change Chambers’ position as the officer in charge of aviation, so he still did not have any official authority.  Now with cognizance divided between the bureaus, and each theoretically appointing an officer to oversee aviation details within the bureau, Chambers’ task of coordinating aviation became exponentially more difficult.[42]

            In October 1913, as a result of the ongoing debate over aviation policy and organization, acting Secretary of the Navy Franklin Delano Roosevelt appointed a board of Navy officers headed by Chambers to develop a comprehensive plan for naval aviation.  The board, known as the Chambers’ Board, consisted of Chambers, Towers, Marine Lieutenant Alfred A. Cunningham, Naval Constructor Holden C. Richardson, Commander Carlo B. Britain, Bureau of Navigation, Commander S. S. Robison, Bureau of Steam Engineering, and Lieutenant Manley S. Simons, Bureau of Ordinance.  After gathering information for six weeks and deliberating for twelve days, the board submitted a unanimous report advocating a comprehensive increase in the Navy’s commitment to aviation.[43] 

            The board called for a fleet dirigible, two balloons, and an increase in airplanes from eight to fifty, with fifty more in reserve and six to be used as trainers.  The current air station at Greenbury Point, which had proved unsatisfactory primarily because of weather conditions, was to be closed.  The board requested that the main aviation facilities be moved to the recently abandoned Navy base at Pensacola, Florida.  This base was chosen because of its availability and the exceptional weather conditions for flying.  The board also understood that local interest in reopening the base would provide additional support in Congress and with the new administration.[44]

In addition, the Board recommended the assignment of Navy ships for use in experiments on the feasibility of deploying aviation with the fleet.  Organizationally, the Board did not recommend the creation of a separate bureau for aviation. Instead it suggested establishing an Office of Naval Aeronautics within the Office of the Secretary of the Navy.  This office, consisting of a captain and secretarial staff, would not have the powers recommended by the General Board’s August report, but would instead coordinate the activities of the various bureaus.  Compared to the expenditures of the European powers at the time, the total cost for the plan was a modest $1,297,700.[45]

            At the conclusion of the Chambers Board’s deliberations, Captain Mark L. Bristol replaced Chambers as the officer in charge of aviation.  Chambers’ status within the Navy had become tenuous and controversial.  His report and general standing on naval aviation satisfied Secretary Daniels, but alienated Fiske who wanted a more forceful voice for aviation. In June of 1913, a panel of officers assigned to pare the Navy’s officer rolls had placed Chambers on the retired list because he lacked the necessary service time at sea for promotion to Rear Admiral.  Only the direct intervention of Daniels had saved Chambers, who listed himself as retired in his report the General Board at that time.  Daniels kept Chambers in the Navy until 1919, but his devotion to aviation had permanently damaged his career and ruined any chance for promotion.[46]

            In direct response to the recommendations of the Chambers’ Board, Captain Bristol and the Office of Aeronautics was transferred from the Bureau of Navigation to the Division of Operations in the Office of the Secretary of the Navy on 7 January 1914.  Fiske selected the recently promoted captain for the position to provide more aggressive leadership for aviation, even going so far as to share his desk in the Division of Operations with Bristol.  This move coincided with Fiske’s own growing agitation with Secretary Daniels and President Woodrow Wilson.  Fiske felt that the Wilson administration was unresponsive to the Navy’s needs and that the country was falling further and further behind European nations in naval technology and strength.[47]

On 20 January, almost the entire aviation component of the Navy, all nine planes and seven of the nine pilots, arrived at Pensacola, Florida, aboard the old battleship Mississippi and collier Orion to establish the new aeronautical station.  Bristol secured Mississippi as a aviation test vessel on the strength of the Chambers Board report.  Lieutenant Commander Henry C. Mustin, commander of the Mississippi, assumed command of the station as well, with Towers operating the flight school.  This command system proved cumbersome, and authority was shifted to the base in November 1916, at that time the base was also officially designated Naval Aeronautic Station, Pensacola.  Six Curtiss flying boats, two Curtiss hydroaeroplanes, two Wright hydroaeroplanes, and a Burgess flying boat comprised the base’s complement of aircraft.[48]

            Actions in Mexico interrupted flight training and experimentation at Pensacola in April 1914, but gave Towers, the other officers, and the men of naval aviation a chance to demonstrate their worth to the fleet.  Two groups of aviators, with a total of five aircraft, embarked aboard Mississippi and Birmingham and joined the naval squadrons operating off Tampico and Veracruz as part of the American intervention in Mexico.  At Veracruz, where most of the action took place, the naval aviators supported not only the fleet but also the Army and Marine intervention force.[49]

            Primarily, the aviators spotted for the fleet and intervention force, locating Mexican forces and assessing their strengths.  Several flights were conducted to search for mines and shore emplacements, the first flown by Lieutenant(jg) P.N.L. Bellinger on 25 April.  Once the fleet had secured the harbor operations shifted inland with aviation scouting for Marines under fire outside Veracruz.  During these operations naval aviation received its baptism of fire, when on 6 May Bellinger and Lieutenant(jg) R. C. Saufley’s plane was damaged by rifle fire.[50]

            Surprisingly, Admiral Charles Badger, commander of the Atlantic Fleet, had discussed the possibility of intervention in Mexico, and specifically naval aviation’s role in such an operation, with Towers as early as the Guantanamo fleet exercises in 1913.  The success of aviation in the operations at Veracruz cemented Badger’s support for the new technology.  Naval aviation’s exploits also excited the public as reports of the intervention, and specifically aviation, appeared on the front pages of newspapers across the country.[51] 

This attention led to direct a improvement in aviation’s standing within the Navy with the official establishment of an Office of Naval Aeronautics in the Division of Operations under the Secretary of the Navy on 1 July 1914.  The creation of this office marked the first official recognition of aviation in the Navy, all the prior incarnations of the office had been created and maintained unofficially.  The new office still did not have total control of aviation.  The only real change this official recognition brought to the office was Bristol being assigned a clerk, the first ever assigned to aviation.[52]

            Events in Europe now overtook aviation’s development in the United States and added greater impetus to preparing its use for the fleet.  With the outbreak of war in August 1914, the small group of naval aviators took on additional duties, serving as observers in the various warring countries.  Mustin, Bellinger, and Smith undertook the first assignment in August when they traveled to Paris to tour French aircraft factories and bases.  Shortly thereafter, Towers was dispatched to London to serve as an assistant for aviation to the naval attaché, followed by Lieutenant(jg) Victor Herbster being sent to Berlin and Smith to Paris.[53] 

            The European war also changed the Navy’s relationship  with its primary contractors.  European purchases replaced Navy contracts as the primary interest for many of the manufactures since the Navy’s spending remained at prewar levels which were quickly dwarfed by European, primarily British and French, orders.  For the years 1914-1916, American aviation companies exported more than four hundred planes, as opposed to selling fewer than two hundred domestically.  European orders of all aviation material for this period totaled nearly nine million dollars[54]

            The General Board urged Secretary Daniels to request $5,000,000 for aviation in the 1915 budget, but the money was not forthcoming.  Instead, Bristol secured $250,000 from the Navy Department’s bureaus for the 1915 fiscal year.  Due to this continued lack of funding, development of naval aviation in the United States remained at the experimental stage throughout 1914 and 1915.  Work continued not only at Pensacola, but also at the Washington Navy Yard.  At that facility the Navy constructed a wind tunnel, only the second in the United States at the time and the first possessed by the government.  Pontoons and flying boat hulls were tested in the Model Basin.  Lieutenant Warren G. Child established an engine labratory for the Bureau of Steam Engineering.  Finally, work began on a twin engine seaplane designed by Naval Constructor Holden Richardson.[55]

The only significant change in aviation’s status during this time occurred in October of 1915 when the Navy created a new position to oversee aviation, this time designated as the Officer in Charge of Naval Aeronautics and placed within the newly created Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.  Funding for this office would now be provided through the bureaus, thus weakening the authority of the position.  This move resulted from a larger restructuring within the Navy.  Rear Admiral Bradley Fiske and other reformers in the Navy had increased their criticism of Secretary Daniels and solicited the assistance of Congressman Richmond Pearson Hobson (D-AL) in a move to reorganize the Navy to reduce the authority of the Secretary.  Daniels responded to this challenge by arranging an amendment to a naval construction bill which replaced Fiske’s position as Aid for Operations with a Chief of Naval Operations whose authority stemmed directly from the Secretary of the Navy.[56]

            Fiske confronted Daniels about the new position in April 1915 and in anger offered his resignation, which Daniels excepted.  Fiske expected to replace Bristol as the head of aviation, but was instead assigned to lead the Naval War College.  For the new position, Secretary Daniels selected Captain William S. Benson, then commandant of the Philadelphia Naval Yard.  Promoted to Rear Admiral, Benson was a surprise selection and drew criticism in the Navy and the press, chosen more for his perceived loyalty than his ability.[57]

            Aviation suffered because of Bristol’s close relationship with Fiske.  With Fiske in disfavor, Bristol found it more difficult than ever to convince Daniels to support aviation.  Bristol also faced opposition from the new Chief of Naval Operations.  Unlike the members of the General Board, Benson regarded aviation as still experimental and unproved, and opposed any large expenditure on the new technology.  Bristol’s placement in Benson’s Office of the Chief of Naval Operations actually hurt the development of aviation in the Navy.[58]

            Despite growing evidence from Europe that aviation was playing a significant role in the war effort, Congressional interest in and knowledge of the new technology remained low.  In 1915, Bristol appeared before the House Committee on Naval Affairs to discuss the proposed 1916 appropriations.  Bristol’s appearance was only the second by a naval aviator before the committee, Chambers had testified in 1913, and illustrated not only the fledgling status of naval aviation but also Congress’ ignorance of the new technology.[59]

            Bristol and the Navy had submitted a request for aviation which dwarfed all previous allocations, $1,187,600 for the 1916 fiscal year.  Included in that request were forty-eight new airplanes valued at $525,000, a significant number because between them the Army and the Navy only possessed twenty-three planes at the time.  Despite the increase in size this request represented, it remained lower than Bristol’s estimate of the Navy’s needs.  Bristol originally proposed a program including two hundred planes and four hundred pilots, but opposition from Daniels had forced him to reduce his request.[60]

            Appearing before Congress to push for the increased expenditures, Bristol found that while senior Navy officers had doubts about aviation’s progress, members of Congress were virtual neophytes when it came to the new technology.  His testimony before the committee hit an early snag when members interrupted his opening statement to debate nomenclature.  At issue was the use of the words “aviation” and “aeronautics” to describe the appropriations request, specifically which one should be used in the funding bills to best describe the new technology.  Members also interrupted him repeatedly to have the basic concepts of the airplane and its use with the fleet explained to them.  Distinctions between a pontoon plane and a flying boat, aircraft commander and pilot, and rigid versus non-rigid dirigibles had to be explained to the committee members.[61] 

Bristol further explained to the committee how the planes could be used for spotting duty with the fleet and how they could be launched from platforms on the battleships.  During further discussion of air operations, Bristol mentioned that airplanes now engaged in aerial combat.  This revelation came as a shock to some of the committee members who expressed disbelief at the idea of one airplane shooting at another with a machine gun or any other weapon.  Developments in aviation seems to have amazed several of the members who perhaps still regarded aviation as the daredevil, exhibition sport that it had been a few years before.[62]

            Bristol’s tutorial efforts were not in vain, as Congress voted $1,000,000 for aviation as part of the Naval Appropriations Act 3 March 1915.  This money was not actually new appropriations for the Navy, instead Congress reassigned the money out of unobligated balances from “construction and repair of steam machinery.”  The appropriations were placed at the discretion of the Secretary Navy and was authorized for the buying and maintenance of planes and bases.  Bristol later informed Congress that more than half of the money under this appropriation was eventually used for maintenance rather than new purchases.[63]

            The continued European conflict and growing concern over American preparedness led President Wilson to shift his views on military strength in early 1915.  Wilson feared the possibility of a German victory and incidences like the German declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare around Great Britain and the resulting 6 May 1915, sinking of the passenger liner Lusitania increased his concern.  At the urging of his confidant Colonel Edward M. House, Wilson now directed Secretary Daniels to prepare a building program to insure American naval equality with the European powers.  Daniels assigned this task to the General Board who returned a five year building program at a cost of $100,000,000 per year.[64]

            Wilson presented this plan, with minor modifications, to Congress on 7 December 1915.  Termed “A Navy Second To None,” the program included, in part, funding for the construction of ten battleships, six battlecruisers, and fifty destroyers.  The proposal precipitated an extensive legislative debate which ultimately resulted in a modified three year plan to provide 156 new warships, all to be laid down by 1 July 1919.  The first year of the three year plan included appropriations for over $300,000,000, more than double that of the previous year.[65]

            Following Wilson’s announcement in December 1915, Bristol prepared a new estimate for the Navy’s aviation needs.  Bristol had originally presented Secretary Daniels with a “Proposed Program for Further Development of an Air Fleet.” This program included two aircraft carriers and 180 planes at a cost of $17,076,000 for fiscal year 1917.  Bristol pared this program down to $13,670,000 but it still did not meet Benson’s approval and he further reduced the request to $2,000,000.[66]

            In testimony before Congress, Bristol reintroduced the $13,670,000 figure, arguing that the money was necessary to stimulate the aircraft industry.  According to him, the American aircraft industry was underdeveloped compared to those in Europe and insufficient for the Navy’s needs.  Bristol also expressed his dissatisfaction with American designs, declaring that not a single existing American plane was suitable for service with the Navy during wartime.  Commenting on existing aircraft, Bristol added:

If the necessity arose immediately for us to have aeroplanes for the Navy, we could take, and utilize all the factories that are now working, putting them to work on our orders, and in a very short time we could turn out a very large number of aeroplanes of the same type.  But if you wanted me to buy these aeroplanes to-day[sic] for the Navy I would say they are not fit for naval use.[67]

He offered an explanation for this failure, noting “The development would have been more rapid if the appropriations for aeronautics had been larger.”[68]  He concluded, the manufacturers “...want to see the money appropriated and then they will go and get the necessary engineers and establish the necessary plants....”

            The Naval Expansion Act of 1916, Wilson’s “A Navy Second to None,” included $3,500,000 for aviation but also brought an unwanted complication.  As the question of organization still remained as the primary hindrance to increasing aviation’s efficiency and effectiveness, Congress authorized the creation of a Navy Flying Corps of up to one hundred-fifty officers and three hundred-fifty enlisted men.  Similar in concept to the Marine Corps, the corps would be self-contained, with the officers and men serving only within the aviation corps and not within the Navy as a whole.  The corps would also oversee all procurement and development of planes and associated equipment.[69]

            The idea of an aviation corps within the Navy was not new, it had first been suggested in 1910 even before the purchase of the first Navy plane.  Bristol explained to Congress that the idea had originated prior to aviation and that the Navy had considered, and rejected, separate organizations for both torpedo boats and submarines in the past.  Bristol adamantly opposed any suggestion of separating aviation, its officers, or its men from the Navy as a whole.  Bristol emphatically informed Congress of his opposition, stating:

It has been very decidedly demonstrated that in order to get a proper officer for the Navy you must educate him from the time he is a boy to be a naval officer, both theoretically and practically, and that is the reason I do not believe in this special corps of fliers.  I do not see any object in it whatever.[70]

These comments echoed those of Chambers in 1913, who also felt that naval aviators should be naval officers first and foremost.  Both men ultimately feared that separating the fledgling group might cripple its development since the new corps would have to compete for funding as a separate entity.  A provision in the law allowed, but did not require, the Secretary of the Navy to assign officers and men to the Naval Flying Corps.  Because of the concerns within the Navy, Daniels avoided creation of the corps by the simple expedient of never assigning any officer or men to it.[71]

            In March 1916 Bristol requested and was assigned to command of North Carolina, the current aviation experimental ship.  Bristol made this decision in part to avoid being passed over for promotion, as Chambers had been, and partly because of his deteriorating relationship with Benson and Daniels.  When Bristol left office, his position as Director of Naval Aeronautics was abolished and most of his duties were assumed by the bureaus, the rest were transferred to Lieutenant Charles K. Bronson in the Division of Materiel of the Office of Naval Operations.  Bristol assumed the title of Commander of the Air Service but had his tasks steadily reduced until December when they were removed completely and assigned to Rear Admiral Albert Gleaves, Commander Destroyer Force, Atlantic Fleet.  In October 1916 Lieutenant John H. Towers, a more experienced aviator, was ordered to replace Bronson in the Office of Naval Operations.  Bronson remained as an assistant until his death in November 1916 while testing aerial bombing.[72]

            Further complicating the situation were two more reorganizations of the Navy’s aviation bureaucracy, the first in June and the second in August 1916.  The two orders were similar with the second merely clarifying the first.   The first incorporated the Bureaus of Yards and Docks and Ordinance, the General Board, and the Chief of Naval Operations into the existing structure.  The second order, issued 8 August 1916, most fully defined the roles for each organization in aeronautics cognizance;  the term aeronautics being chosen over naval aeroplane.  The order declared that the CNO was “by law charged with the operations of aeronautics,” mirroring the office’s responsibilities for other areas of the Navy.  As to the General Board, the order stated that “The General Board, as with other craft, will advise as to the number and general characteristics of aircraft.”  The Bureaus already assigned cognizance over aeronautics maintained their assigned roles, with some clarification, while Ordnance was added to handle weapons for the planes and Yards and Docks to oversee installations.[73]

            This new system divided the cognizance for aviation between five bureaus, with the CNO and the General Board having additional input.  In addition, Bristol remained as the Officer in Charge of Aviation, and while he was included on the distribution list for the order, his role was not addressed.  This order also curtailed the informal system of experimentation which had dominated aviation since the beginning.  At Pensacola, aviators routinely made modifications to their planes without approval, now any modification or repair costing more than $300 had to be authorized by the proper bureau.  This system, with minor modification remained in effect throughout the war, with each bureau adding an aviation desk and addition staff to support the increased demand.  With changes in the procurement system, aviation now mirrored ships in terms of cognizance within the Navy.[74]

            The changes in procurement also took place in late 1916 when the Navy largely abandoned the system of proprietary purchase in favor of competitive bids.  The proprietary purchase system had worked well with the limited number of planes purchased till this time.  Each plane was constructed in what Bristol described as the “cut-and-try” method so that each ended up being a unique item.  Clearly, the rapid expansion anticipated for aviation dictated that this system be replaced by a more efficient system to handle larger numbers of aircraft.  Aviation therefore adopted the standard Navy system of competitive bidding and the issuance of contracts.  The Navy issued specifications for a new plane, companies submitted competitive bids, the Navy determined the winner, and finally the Navy and the company signed a contract for their delivery.[75]

            In the fall of 1916, the Navy placed its first large scale contract when it ordered thirty Curtiss N-9 training planes. This marked the first time airplanes had been ordered in double digit numbers by the service.  Completion of the contract would have also effectively doubled the number of planes in active service with the Navy, demonstrating the still embryonic size of the aviation contingent.  This procurement contract also marked the end of peacetime development for naval aviation as wartime concerns overtook the service and future contracts were placed after American entry.[76]

            The United States invented aviation and American aviators pioneered its early use at sea.  This promising start occurred in spite of a lack of support from Congress and senior Navy officials.  While many Navy officers were won over to the new technology over time, Congress never fully supported aviation, in either the Army or Navy, prior to United States entry into the war in 1917.  While European nations were spending millions on aviation as early as 1912, the United States Navy’s spending averaged less than $1,000,000 per annum from 1910 to 1916, and considerably less if the 1915 and 1916 spending bills are removed from the equation.

            This lack of funding created a ripple effect of problems throughout naval aviation.  The overall command of aviation remained divided not only for internal political reasons, the existing bureaus not wishing to see another bureau created, but also because the limited budget simply did not warrant a significant change in the Navy’s structure.  The multitude of title changes and office moves for the head of aviation made by the Navy did little to mask the reality that the annual budget for aviation relegated the post to a tertiary status in service.  Without an effective command, aviation lacked guidance and direction. 

Officers who chose aviation as a career path did so at their own peril.  Lieutenant Commander William A. Moffett, later Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics, told Towers in 1913 “Towers, you’re such a nice chap, why don’t you give up this aviation fad?  You’ll surely get yourself killed.  Any man who sticks to it is either crazy or else a damned fool!”[77]  In some ways he was right, Billingsley and Bronson were both killed and Chambers’ promotion was blocked by his aviation duty.  Aviation remained in the eyes of most, an interesting technology but a career dead end.

            The lack of money also precluded the Navy from establishing a consistent and long term procurement program to encourage manufacturers in developing planes suited to the Navy’s needs.  Instead, the Navy purchased the aircraft offered to it, in extremely limited numbers, many of which were basically unsuited for service at sea.  Rather than a strong, if small, air arm to begin the war with, the Navy had a hodgepodge collection of aircraft, each almost unique in its design or configuration because of subsequent rebuilds.  The Curtiss order of 1916 was the only one made by the Navy for any significant number of aircraft, and even that was tiny by European standards of the time.  More importantly, the order was for training aircraft, not planes for front line service, and further demonstrates the Navy’s unprepared status.  When the Navy entered the war, the necessary front line aircraft, the factories to produce them, and the men to fly them were still to come.

            This dismal picture of pre-war aviation within the Navy should not diminish the efforts of Chambers, Bristol, and the other aviation enthusiasts within the service who did a superb job in mustering the meager resources available to them.  Chamber’s early efforts insured the Navy’s place in the record books, even if it was largely undeserved.  Flight operations during the fleet exercises and at Vera Cruz brought the attention of most of the Navy to aviation and cemented interest in the new technology.  Young officers like Towers, Mustin, and Jerome Hunsaker formed the corps of naval aviation’s leaders and provided exceptional guidance for decades to come.