CHAPTER IV

CONGRESS 1914-1921

            Congress entered this period largely ignorant of the developments in aviation technology and exited it disenchanted with aviation as a whole.  As the ultimate arbitrator of aviation’s future in both the Army and Navy, Congress remained resolutely apathetic to its development.  While complaints from the military or the industry might bring public declarations of support, the realities of fiscal conservatism which dominated political thinking after the war ensured that significant investment would not be forthcoming.  The promise of aviation’s future remained mired in the failures of its past.

            Funding for aviation went through three distinct phases during this period.  Prior to U.S. entry into the First World War, Congress appropriated a minuscule amount of money for aviation.  Congress preferred to postpone spending until a clear path for aviation development evolved to insure that the money was not wasted.  Once the war began, any reservations against spending disappeared and aviation received exceptional funding.  With the funding also came exceptional expectations, expectations the air program proved unable to meet. Congress convened hearings to determine the true cause of the program’s failure, although many members had already placed the blame on the industry’s greed.  While these hearings proved largely inconclusive, the legacy of unfulfilled expectations and allegations of profiteering continued to haunt the aviation program and the industry after the war, when once again money for aviation became a scarce commodity.

            Some members of Congress developed an interest in aviation prior to the First World War, but most of them remained woefully ignorant of the new technology.  In House Naval Affairs Committee hearings in 1915, Representative Thomas Butler(R-PA) probably spoke for most of his colleagues when he said of aviation “I will try to catch up, but it has got beyond me at this stage.”[1]  Many of the members still associated airplanes with the daredevil, stunt flying popular before the war and had difficulty adjusting to its use in modern war.  Butler again expressed this sentiment, “You are talking about aeroplanes and shooting guns in the air.”

            While some members of Congress expressed interest in aviation and sought to increase government support of the new technology, most hesitated to commit large sums of money without a clear path of development.  Faced with uncertainty, they chose a conservative, wait and see, approach, allowing industry and other nations to develop aviation.  In early 1915, Senator Ben Tillman(D-SC), Chairman of the Senate Naval Affairs Committee, made the case before the Senate for just such a policy, arguing:

Let us wait until the war has shown us what kind of craft we should construct.  Time alone can teach us whether future sea fighting will be waged most successfully on, under, or above the water.  The relative merits of the dreadnoughts, aeroplanes, and Zepplins will be formed ere long, and we can reap the fruits of the experiments now going on without sharing any of the dangers of the conflict.[2]

            Despite Congress’ limited knowledge of aviation, the decision to forego a building program in favor of additional testing was not made in ignorance or haste.  As evidenced by Tillman’s statement, members were aware of the changing nature of warfare and consciously decided to allow the Europeans to incur the expense of development.  This decision extended not only to aviation, but in the eyes of many Congressmen to the military as a whole.  Wilson’s Navy Second to None plan of 1916 met opposition not only from isolationists, but also from those who felt that the era of the dreadnought could be drawing to a close and that additional money spent on the great ships might be wasted. 

            Developments in Europe forced Congress to act, with aviation appropriations increasing along with general defense appropriations in both 1915 and 1916.  Naval appropriations for those years rose from $1,000,000 to $3,500,000.  Still, reservations remained about the wisdom of investing the money before the technology was fully developed.  Representative Oscar Callaway(D-TX) questioned Captain Mark Bristol, at the time Director of Naval Aviation, about the increase in appropriations and the stimulus to the industry it was supposed to provide, noting

We appropriated a million dollars last year for aeroplanes.  Now, with that million-dollar incentive—and you say at this time we are on the road to the development of this satisfactory motor;  that is the thing in aeroplane development that we have not reached a proper standard—why has not that million dollars been an incentive?[3]

Despite Bristol’s best attempts to assure him that progress was being made, Callaway continued to attack the idea of investing money in aviation production until a design had been perfected.  As Callaway phrased it,

If it is yet a question as to whether or not we can develop the proper kind of motor, why not continue that experimental work until we get that thing thoroughly settled before we go into the appropriation of $13,000,000 for aeroplane equipment?[4]

When the United States entered the war in 1917 these reservations were set aside and Congress responded with staggering appropriations for the military in general.  Army aviation alone received an initial commitment of $640,000,000, with naval aviation receiving another $184,000,000.  Before the war ended, Congress appropriated more than $1,000,000,000 for aviation.  The level of funding brought with it considerable expectations and the aviation program failed to meet them.  The appropriations were passed with a minimal amount of opposition during a rush of patriotism, but as the American aviation program continued to struggle it fell under tremendous criticism during committee investigations and Congressional debates.[5]

Wartime Congressional enthusiasm for aviation was initially dampened by the ongoing aviation patent dispute.  In a time when most envisioned the nation pulling together to support the war effort, the continued efforts of Curtiss and Wright-Martin to enforce their patents infuriated many Congressmen.  The cross licensing agreement which provided for a fee of $200, later $100, to be collected on each plane constructed in the United States did little to alleviate Congressional anger.  Wartime contracts were cost-plus based and hence any money paid to Curtiss or Wright-Martin as part of the cross licensing agreement, initially $2,000,000 then reduced to $1,000,000 for each, ultimately would come from the government.[6]

Prior to the formation of the Aircraft Manufacture’s Association which would oversee the cross-licensing agreement, Dr. Charles D. Walcott, Executive Chairman of the N.A.C.A., alerted Congress to the problems posed by the patent dispute in a letter to Representative Lemuel Phillips Padgett(D-TN), Chairman of the Naval Affairs Committee.  Walcott wrote that “...the unsettled status of the Wright patents has been paramount in holding back the progress of aeronautic development in this country....”  As a solution to the problem, he proposed that “...a far better arrangement could be arrived at by the Government taking over the patents, if such a thing is possible.”  This problem, the various ways in which the government could release the necessary patents to insure the smooth production of aircraft for the war effort, became the source of Congressional debate. 

Two options initially presented themselves to Congress.  The first was simply to seize the patents, a proposal first made by Representative William Henry Stafford(R-WI), under war emergency legislation.  This idea received very little support in Congress, probably because of the precedent that it would have set.  Instead, Congress followed the recommendation of Secretary of the Navy Curtiss Wilbur and passed legislation to purchase the necessary patents, namely from Wright-Martin and Curtiss, with $1,000,000 being appropriated for the purpose.  The creation of the AMA forestalled the purchase of the patents but ultimately led to allegations of collusion and monopoly.[7]

The appropriation of $640,000,000 for Army aviation in 1917 drew surprisingly little criticism from the members of Congress.  The primary concern was not over the amount, which actually exceeded the Army’s request, but over its implementation.  The large sum and the need to speed its expenditure meant that Congress had to entrust more responsibility to the Army, and its various departments, than normal.  Representative Joseph Swagar Sherley(D-KY) made this point on the House floor, declaring that “...the old relationship that existed in regard to appropriations and the details of them was one that had to pass away...we must of necessity trust the departments in a degree and to an extent that we never dreamed of before.”[8]

The appropriation debate also offered aviation enthusiasts the opportunity to chastise other members of Congress for not supporting the technology sooner.  In a long, and often rambling, speech before the House, Representative Philip Pitt Campbell(R-KS), a member of the Aero Club of America, recounted the history of Congressional support of aviation.  Beginning with Samuel Peirpont Langley, who he suggested somehow was unable to defend himself against criticism because of a need for official secrecy, he demonstrated how the government continually chose to underfund aviation.  He noted that in 1913 the nation had only appropriated $300,000 for aviation, which ranked the country thirteenth in the world, behind even Bulgaria and Spain.  He traced the rise in appropriations since 1914, but also noted that the current recommendation, the $640,000,000, deeply concerned him.  To assuage his fears and those of his colleagues, he proposed the creation of a new department to oversee aviation.  In support of such a measure, he noted:

In my judgment the War Department is now too much overburdened.  Accustomed to operate within an appropriation of approximately $150,000,000 per year, we have recently voted $3,000,000,000, the judicious expenditure of which will tax every bureau to its utmost capacity.  Believing that a separate department should have been created to supervise the expenditure of the appropriation carried in this bill, I appealed both to the chairman of the Senate and House Committee on Military Affairs for a hearing [on an independent department] on the opening day of the present session.[9]

Ultimately, Congress appropriated the $640,000,000 for Army aviation and additional $45,000,000 for naval aviation.  Rather than creating an independent department for aviation, Congress authorized the Aircraft Production Board to coordinate the Army and the Navy’s procurement in order to insure the maximum efficiency.  Aviation then enjoyed a grace period during which Congress and the public offered considerable support and very little criticism.  The beginning of 1918, however, brought increased attention and growing criticism.  Eventually, four distinct investigations of the Aircraft Production Board and the industry would be conducted, one by a friend of President Wilson’s, one by Charles Evans Hughes in the Attorney General’s office, and two by Congressional committees.[10]

The first investigation was the most unusual, conducted at President Wilson’s private request by noted sculptor and aviation enthusiast Gutzon Borglum.  Borglum conducted a secret investigation of the industry and concluded that an aircraft conspiracy existed and that the ranking members of the Aircraft Production Board, Colonel Edward Deeds and Howard Coffin were participating in the conspiracy.  Despite Borglum’s questionable credentials, and admitted bias against the industry, the revelation of his investigation and supposed findings received a great deal of attention in Congress and the press.  Borglum first attracted Senate attention when an article on his investigation appeared in the New York Times.  In the article, Borgum called for a criminal investigation of the aircraft industry and the APB, charging that “the conduct of the Aircraft Board in ‘corralling contracts’ and placing them in the hands of manufacturers, some of whom were utterly unprepared for the work, was ‘unfair, unjustified, and, in the Nation’s emergency, criminal.’”[11]

In Senate debate, members found a number of reasons to be concerned about Borglum and his investigation.  Many expressed at least mild outrage at the secrecy under which it was conducted.  They also questioned his qualifications, leading one, Senator Frank Bosworth Brandegee(R-CT), to note:  “The President selected him, and, therefore I think probably he did not have any qualifications.”  Despite these objections, Borglum’s allegations rang too true for many of the Senators and several members called for investigations into the air program.  Senator Porter James McCumber(R-ND) summarized Congressional feelings as follows:

Without reference to the qualifications of this gentleman[Borglum], the fact is certain that we have appropriated $640,000,000 to build aircraft;  that there is now before us a bill to appropriate $400,000,000 more, making more than a billion dollars—the entire cost of the Franco-Prussian War as figured by Germany when she imposed that amount of indemnity upon France.  We have used that much money and are asked for this additional sum:  and what have we got?  That is what the American people now want to know.  What has become of the money, and where are the assets that are to be placed against the $640,000,000 which we have expended?  I should like to have some one upon the Military Affairs Committee or some one in the Senate give us information as to what has been done.[12]

Borglum’s report to the President and his allegations of difficulty in obtaining information from the War Department led Wilson to refer the matter to the Justice Department.  To investigate the aircraft industry, the Attorney-General, Thomas W. Gregory, enlisted the aid of Charles Evans Hughes, a former Supreme Court Judge and Wilson’s opponent in the 1916 election.  Hughes was chosen not only for his expertise and knowledge, but also because he was a Republican and Wilson wanted to avoid accusations of a cover up.  Hughes interviewed hundreds of individuals and eventually composed a report based on more than 10,000 pages of evidence.  Hughes concluded that no illegal activities had taken place, but that a large number of unethical and incompetent actions had greatly hindered the aviation program.[13]

The appointment of Hughes indicated the extent to which the debate over the aviation program had become partisan.  The Republicans hesitated to criticize the administration’s war effort for fear of being accused of partisan politics or even treason.  Brandegee stated as much when discussing the Borglum affair, declaring

I am not going to introduce any formal resolution about this matter, for I should immediately be called a traitor or pro-German if I tried to find out anything;  but I think...it would not be improper for the Committee on Military affairs to investigate the matter, unless the President thinks it is incompatible with the public interest or the Democratic Party’s interest....[14]

Senator Lee Slater Overman(D-NC) felt compelled to preface his criticism of the air program with “I do not wish to open a political debate.  What I have to say I hope will not arouse any antagonism or partisanship.”[15]

As the program continued to disappoint, however, the criticism grew stronger and the attacks became more open.  Senator Henry Cabot Lodge(R-MA), dismissed concerns over secrecy and declared “We know here and have known for weeks, as the Germans have known, that we have no fighting planes in France.”[16]  He continued “Mr. President, we have granted powers and we have given money without stint;  but appropriating money and granting power will lead to nothing unless the money is wisely expended and the powers are efficiently exercised.”  He continued to criticize the Army’s handling of the air program and called for an investigation and public disclosure of the problems.  He concluded “The facts I have recited in regard to our aeroplanes are known to Germany.  It is time our people understood them.”

            The Republican attacks did not go unanswered.  John Sharp Williams, the senior Senator from Mississippi, in particular took umbrage with Lodge’s statements.  He compared Lodge’s allegations to a poison gas attack on Washington and claimed that only a change in the wind would save the country.  He chastised the Republicans for their disloyalty and complained that the party was “...lukewarm in their support of the administration and therefore in their Americanism.”[17] He then went on to place the blame for the air program’s failure on the Republicans, noting

...the men at the head of the Shipping Board, the Aircraft Board, and the other boards of the Government preparing for the war are as a rule, prominent Republicans of the country.  They are true, patriotic, and honest in every sense of the word.  It is not against them that they are Republicans;  it is in their favor under a Democratic administration that they are;  but I mention the fact merely to show that these men, who were probably recommended by Republican Senators, are the people at fault, if anybody is.  

The Navy largely escaped the criticisms of the aviation program, partisan and other wise, because the funds appropriated for naval aviation were considerably smaller and the Navy appeared to be doing a more efficient job of delivering aircraft to the theater of combat.  Defenders of naval aviation were quick to point out that Navy patrol aircraft were operating in Europe and that the Royal Navy was operating American-designed flying boats.  Supporters also pointed to the Naval Aircraft Factory at Philadelphia as an example of the Navy’s proactive approach to the problem of aircraft production.  Still, even the Navy’s supporters had to acknowledge problems with the program.  Representative William Bacon Oliver(D-AL) admitted

No;  I do not think anyone is satisfied with the progress that aviation has made, either in the Navy or in the Army;  but I think the officers directing the aviation department of the Navy are capable and industrious and have put forth every possible effort to hurry up construction.  They simply could not accomplish the impossible, and their disappointment is as keen as ours.[18]

During his investigation, Charles Evans Hughes attempted to postpone any Congressional activity until he had finished his inquiry, but Congress persevered and Senate Military Affairs committee conducted two different investigations during 1918.  The first was chaired by Senator George Earl Chamberlain(D-OR) and completed its report early in April 1918.  The committee concluded that

...much of the delay in producing completed combat aeroplanes is due to ignorance of the art and to failure to organize the effort in such a way as to centralize authority and bring about quick decisions.  A certain aloofness in dealing with persons possessing information based upon experience, an apparent intention of confining the actual production to a restricted number of concerns, and a failure of the officials in charge of the work to grasp the situation in a broader way and seize upon the best approved foreign engines and planes and proceed promptly to build as many as possible for the campaign of 1918 has contributed to the failure.[19]

The report also concluded that aviation was becoming a fundamental part of modern warfare and urged that the United States endeavor to keep pace with improvements in the technology.  It was critical of the country’s efforts before the war and accused the nation and its military officers of being too narrow minded and slow to adapt.  The Chamberlain report recommended that a long term plan be prepared for the development of aviation and that fundamental to such a plan would be a separate department to oversee aviation.  Congress resisted the creation of a new department and instead authorized a second investigation over the summer.[20]

Senator Charles S. Thomas(D-CO)presided over the second inquiry, speaking with many of the same individuals covered by Chamberlain.  In August 1918 the committee issued a report which included eight wide ranging recommendations.  As before, the committee recommended the creation of a single department to oversee aviation.  The report noted:  “The creation of the department of the air would unify the service, thus removing all friction between the Army and Navy divisions of the service by subjecting both to the control of a common head.”[21]  As to production, the report noted that the current output was finally reaching the levels promised over a year before.  Now, the report concluded, focus needed to be shifted to the long term development of aviation.  As the report declared:  “The aeroplane is a product of American genius, but the credit for its development largely belongs to other nations.  America should meet this challenge by bringing the aeroplane to still greater efficiency.”[22]

Neither of these reports greatly affected wartime production of aircraft in the United States.  The time needed to construct production facilities and stockpile material precluded any serious contribution during 1917.  After that, a combination of military indecision and industry inexperience, with admittedly some legitimate profiteering, greatly hindered aircraft production.  By mid-1918 most of these problems had abated, if not disappeared, but the war would end before the full weight of American aircraft production could be applied to the front.  Despite producing thousands of successful training aircraft, the industry failed to produce combat aircraft, either fighters or bombers, in any respectable number, and it was this fact that Congress focused on after the war. 

Congress refused to accept that it had appropriated more than $1,000,000,000 for aviation during the war and gotten fewer than 200 combat aircraft at the front.  The training planes, bases, and new pilots which constituted a sound foundation for future aviation meant little to Congress.  Instead, its members focused on failures such as the $6,500,000 spent on canceled SPAD fighter production, or the nearly $6,000,000 spent on 1,200 DH-4 light bombers which had to be destroyed because of structural problems.  While the evidence remained weak, many Congressmen came to the conclusion that the industry had unduly profited from war-time contracts, with the cooperation of, or because of a lack of vigilance by, the Aircraft Production Board and the military.[23]

After the war’s conclusion, two activities interested Congress, reducing the military expenditures and assigning blame for the failure of wartime programs.  The first of these was inevitable, the second would become an ongoing activity which never fully satisfied anybody.  Both of these activities also contained more than a modicum of partisan politics.  The Republicans intended to establish themselves as the party of fiscal responsibility and place the blame for wartime abuses squarely on the Democratic administration.  The Democrats were willing to acquiesce to many of the Republican spending cuts, but often warned of the dangers of cutting too much.  They also sought to defend the Wilson administration’s handling of the war and if blame needed to be placed, to insure that is was placed on the industry.

In early 1919, the House of Representatives began debate on naval appropriations for the 1920 fiscal year.  At the war’s conclusion, the Navy had returned more than $330,000,000 previously appropriated for the war, $97,000,000 of which had been allocated for aviation.  Total war appropriations for naval aviation reached approximately $185,000,000 and the Navy was under very little delusion that this level of funding would continue.  The Navy submitted to the Committee on Naval Affairs a request of $85,000,000 for aviation for fiscal year 1920, but soon reduced this to a more reasonable $36,000,000.  The nearly $50,000,000 reduction still did not satisfy the committee, which only approved $25,000,000 for aviation and limited the Navy to six heavier-than-air stations in the United States.[24]

Despite the further reduction, the appropriations bill came under heavy fire during House debates.  Representative Stafford began the attack, demanding to “...ascertain what is the purpose of providing $25,000,000 for aviation purposes for the Navy, now that the war is at an end.”[25]  He went on to point out that naval aviation had only required $3,500,000 the year before the war and that the Navy now had access to the vast stock of surplus aircraft possessed by the War Department.  Therefore, according to Stafford, the only reason the Navy needed the additional money was because the service was incapable of efficiently overseeing aviation.

Stafford was joined by other Representatives who demanded an explanation for the large sum being requested for naval aviation.  In a bid to create a department of aviation, La Guardia introduced an amendment to reduce the appropriation from $25,00,000 to $15,000,000.  He insisted that if aviation expenditures continued at exorbitant levels the military would never be encouraged to obtain maximum efficiency.  La Guardia insisted “Let us take the money away from them until they come to their senses.”[26]  Their senses to La Guardia could only mean a unified air service in the mold of the Royal Air Force and he announced his attention to attempt to limit any appropriation for aviation, Army or Navy, until one was created. 

La Guardia was joined by Representatives Benjamin Grubb Humphreys(D-MS), James Robert Mann(R-IL), and Horace Mann Towner(R-IA), all of who argued for a large reduction in aviation appropriations.  Towner regarded $25,000,000 as sufficient for total aviation, Army, Navy, and Postal, while Mann suggested that the entire Navy needed no more than $25,000,000 per year during peacetime.  Mann called for a return to peacetime spending in all things, not just aviation.  In a long address which drew applause from other members, Mann declared:

Twenty-five million dollars for aviation would be a very large sum for the Government to expend in all of its activities along that line.  But here is a proposition to expend $25,000,000 in one of the least important aviation activities.  We have a large amount for the Army, a considerable amount of the Post Office, and then this huge sum of $25,000,000 for the Navy.  We have so gotten in the habit of talking about billions of dollars that nobody stops to think any more what a million dollars amounts to.  A million dollars is a thousand thousand dollars.  The gentleman from New York[Mr. LaGuardia], himself an aviator, of whom we are all proud[,] proposes to reduce the sum to $15,000,000.  That in itself is an enormous sum of money.  Let us have some sanity.  Nobody will be the loser is no money is expended in the Navy for aviation except for mere maintenance.  Let us get back to bedrock and know where we stand before we expend these enormous sums of money chasing phantoms.[27]

The Navy was not without defenders, namely Padgett and Joseph Hampton Moore(R-PA).  They pointed to the Navy’s exemplary service during the war and its work in developing its own aircraft production facilities.  They also stressed the great sacrifices already made by the Navy in the name of austerity.  Both men concluded that the Navy was being attacked not because of its own actions, but as a spill over of anger directed at the War Department.  Moore elaborated on this idea and Congressional attitude in general, stating:

I think it is important to call attention to this strange condition that prevails in a legislative body in connection with aviation, not by way of reflection upon the Navy Department, which has not been criticized, so far as I have observed, for its conduct of aviation up to date, but because of the unusual proceedings in the War Department, which resulted in the exoneration of one Col. Deeds, who had been placed in charge of a part of the expenditure of $640,000,000 for aviation for war purposes, after he had been brought to the bar by a former justice of the Supreme Court of the United States appointed by the President to investigate, and who was supported in his findings by the Attorney General.  I do not hesitate to say that in the case of Col. Deeds and the expenditures of that $640,000,000 for which, according to the Senate report, we did not secure a single combat plane in France, the results were not such as to inspire congressional confidence in lump-sum appropriations.[28]

Navy supporters managed to restore the $25,000,000, but debate revealed the deep animosity against military spending which existed in Congress and the difficulty which the Navy would experience in securing funding for aviation in the future. 

Congress also chose in 1919 to convene yet another inquiry into aviation expenditures during the war, as part of a larger and wide ranging investigation into the general conduct of the war.  This inquiry would do little to determine conclusively the extent of wartime profiteering but it did lead to considerable animosity between Congress and the aircraft industry.  The Democrats regarded the inquiry as little more than a veiled attack on the Wilson administration and vigorously defended the military’s war record, with the debaters almost coming to blows on at least one occasion.[29]

            In 1919, the House convened a Select Committee on Expenditures in the War Department.  As a part of that investigation Representative James A. Frear(R-WI) chaired a subcommittee on aviation.  Frear defined the subcommittee’s purpose in very basic terms, “...to ascertain where the responsibility rested for failure to get airplanes over there.”[30]  During six weeks of hearings the subcommittee solicited testimony from leading members of the military, including Secretary of War Newton D. Baker and Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels, members of the aviation industry, the heads of Wright-Martin and Curtiss for instance, as well as a number of leading suppliers of wood for the industry.  Records of the testimony totaled more than 3,900 pages, which made this the most extensive hearing on the subject.[31]

The scope of the hearings exceeded those of the wartime investigations, encompassing more than 700 aviation contracts worth at least $100,000 each.  In addition to aircraft production, the subcommittee focused a great deal of attention on the raw material suppliers because of charges of profiteering by lumber firms.  The hearings also extended to include matters such as the construction of airfields and their disposition after the war.  A number of cities, such as Dayton, Ohio, and Miami, Florida, had donated land for airfields during the war and that land was now being returned to them with millions of dollars worth of improvements.  In the case of Dayton, McCook Field would be returned to the city and then because the Army required a facility in the area another piece of land would have to be purchased and a new field constructed at a cost of nearly $3,000,000 according to La Guardia.[32]

In its final report, the subcommittee concluded that the United States had expended $1,051,511,988 on aviation during the war.  For this sum, only 213 combat aircraft, DH-4’s, produced in the United States had actually reached the front.  This figure only included aircraft actually used in missions at the front and not the Navy aircraft used in shore patrol and bombing missions.  The subcommittee report condemned these numbers, declaring:

These facts confronted the committee at the outset of the investigation and whatever explanations or excuses may be offered of prospective quantity production, the fact remains that while the American Congress and the people gave ungrudgingly and were beguiled by responsible officials with promises of 20,000 American airplanes that were to precede our American armies to France, when the armistice was signed over 2,000,000 American soldiers had reached France and turned defeat into victory, while America’s fighting airplane expectations and promises existed only on paper.[33]

The report condemned the number of aircraft delivered as wholly inadequate as well as the design and construction of the DH-4.  The training program was criticized for delivering too few, and inferior quality, flyers.  The subcommittee concluded that American flyers sustained five times as many casualties as other Army officers.  The subcommittee, however, did not compare American pilots to those of other nations, so the conclusion is largely irrelevant.  The subcommittee also chose to reference the previous investigations, by Borglum, Hughes, Chamberlain, and Thomas.  The report reiterated and reaffirmed many of their conclusions as to the causes of America’s aviation difficulties.[34] 

             In direct relation to the aircraft industry, the Frear Report added little to the existing charges, although it did employ stronger and more derogatory language to describe them.  The report placed the majority of the blame for the program’s failure on two colonels, Edward Deeds and Brice P. Disque.  Deeds, in his role as head of the Aircraft Production Board, was accused of gross incompetence and of funneling contracts to his business associates.  His decision to adopt the Liberty engine as the standard engine for American aircraft was roundly criticized as being unsound and made largely in self interest.  The committee insisted that problems encountered while trying to perfect the Liberty engine had left many factories idle for several months and had delayed the entire program by as much as six months.  The report also hinted at greater corruption by noting that shortly after the Hughes report had recommended Deeds face a court martial, he had in fact been received very warmly by the Wilson administration and never faced charges for his actions.[35]

            Of the more than $1,000,000,000 expended on aircraft production during the war, more than $48,000,000 of it went to purchase spruce, a program under the management of Col. Disque.  This program, and Disque’s activities in the Pacific Northwest, consumed more than one-third of the report.  The report charged Disque, a former cavalry officer who served principally in the Philippines, not only with gross mismanagement and waste, but also of attempting to defraud the government.  Disque attempted to establish his own logging army, using more than 28,000 soldiers to cut spruce.  His use of these soldiers instead of trained loggers already employed in the region, according to the report, not only hindered spruce production but also violated U.S. law on several occasions.  Primarily, the report charged that Disque overpaid the soldiers more than $4,500,000 during the war.  The report condemned Disque and his activities in no uncertain language, declaring:  “...in Oregon and Washington, 6,000 miles from the front, Col. Disque, a modern soldier of fortune, set up an autocratic pompous military establishment that rivaled anything ever possessed by any European or Asiatic potentate.”[36]

            While condemning Deeds and Disque, the report did not excuse others associated with the program.  General George O. Squier, Chief of the Signal Corps, was not found to be corrupt, but merely incompetent.  The report said of his decision to adopt standard aircraft, namely the DH-4,

This reckless, foolish policy threw aside every tried life preserver, every efficient air weapon used by all other countries after 30 months of war, and resulted in disastrous blunders and inexcusable delays, when delays meant unnecessary loss of life and possible loss of battles.  Gen. Squier threw the die in April, 19117, and pooled everything for the Liberty motor experiment, which was used in the hopeless D. H. 4’s, ignoring all other weapons.[37]

            Ultimately, despite the aggressive language of the Frear report it added very little, other than exposing the abuses of Disque and the spruce program, to what had already been established by previous reports.  The War Department made a series of very poor, but not criminal, decisions concerning aviation largely out because of inexperience.  The industry expanded at a phenomenal rate, which necessitated including a number of companies, primarily automobile manufacturers, with little to no experience in aviation.  As a whole, the industry and the Aircraft Production Board made some highly questionable decisions.  The decision to standardize with the Liberty engine, and its ensuing development problems,  proved the most disastrous of these decisions and effected the rest of the production program by causing problems with the SPAD and Bristol fighter and the DH-4 light bomber programs.[38] 

            What the Frear report ignored, and nobody seemed to point out at the time, was the conduct of the naval aviation program.  The problems outlined by the subcommittee, and the previous investigations, all dealt with the War Department and its suppliers.  The Navy contributions to the war effort received no recognition from the subcommittee, however the production difficulties experienced by the Navy also garnered no condemnations.  Therefore, most of the ill will directed at the Navy and its expenditures on aviation occurred mainly due to association with the Army’s activities and not because of any direct actions on the Navy’s part.[39]

            The Frear report, again following the pattern of previous investigations, recommended the creation of a single air service.  The report concluded: 

Fortunately, or unfortunately, the striking failure of the War Department to rise to the aircraft emergency, either in peace or in was, has made necessary the creation of a separate bureau or department of aeronautics.  Therein all governmental activities should be centered with a capable, progressive official at the head.[40]

Not surprisingly, General William Mitchell received prominent mention as the potential head for the new service, which would assume the responsibilities not only of the Army and the Navy but also of the Post Office and Department of the Interior. 

            Again the Navy was not mentioned in the recommendations, the need for an independent air service lay almost solely with the failure of the Army.  La Guardia presided over hearings considering just such a reorganization beginning in December 1919 and extending into 1920.  The move, supported by Mitchell and other aviation enthusiasts, was strongly opposed by the Navy, particularly Secretary Daniels.  Daniels’ influence on Wilson and other ranking Democrats probably served to block any serious attempt to create an independent air force.  But, his imminent departure following Wilson’s defeat in 1920 increased the threat that aviation would be removed from the Navy’s control.[41]

            Therefore, in 1921, when Congressman Frederick C. Hicks(R-NY) introduced legislation to create a Bureau of Aeronautics within the Navy Department, it received almost united Navy support.  Hicks assured the House that the bill had the strong support of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, Secretary of the Navy Edwin Denby, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Robert E. Coontz, Chief of the Bureau of Construction and Repair Rear Admiral David Taylor, and, of course, the Director of Naval Aviation, Captain William Moffett.  Hicks argued that an independent Bureau of Aeronautics would allow not only improved results from naval aviation but also maximum efficiency and return on the money Congress appropriated.[42]

            What little debate occurred in the House focused on this question of efficiency, and whether the new bureau would increase or decrease naval aviation appropriations.  Representatives William Johnson Graham(R-IL), Franklin Wheeler Mondell(R-WY), and Charles Frank Reavis(R-NE) argued against the measure, insisting that the creation of any new bureau insured that requests for naval aviation would increase.  As Mondell asked, “Did anybody ever hear of a bureau being created that did not cost anything?”[43]  And, Graham insisted: 

The very moment you establish a separate bureau in the Navy or the War Departments or the Post Office Department the head of the bureau will try to get everything he can get, and the bureau will be here in this Congress and the next Congress and every succeeding Congress for ever-increasing appropriations.[44]

In addition to Hicks, Representatives Oliver, Frederick Albert Britten(R-IL), William Robert Wood(R-IN), and Alice Mary Robertson(R-OK) defended the bureau’s creation.  Each stressed the same theme, that a single bureau for aeronautics within the Navy would save money over the current divided system.  They also pointed to the recent creation of the Army Air Corps as a example, declaring that if a single organization to oversee aviation in the Army made that service more efficient then it would do the same for the Navy.  In addition to saving money, the new bureau would also promote aviation within the Navy by giving it a stronger voice in the department.  Oliver argued,

By placing responsibility for the expenditure of all appropriations for aviation under one head and one who by the qualifications fixed in this amendment, will be a sympathetic worker for aviation, you will obtain good results from money appropriated for this important arm of the naval service.[45]

As a corollary, some supporters of the amendment—the  bill had been attached as an amendment to the Navy appropriations in a procedural move—argued that creating a bureau of aeronautics would be a precursor to eventually establishing an independent air service.  Britten made the initial argument, stating that: “If the united air service that our distinguished leader has indicated will probably come in the future should be established—and I think it will be—this bureau is one of the steps that will lead to it.” [46]  The argument appealed to a some of the Congressmen, at least two more openly declaring their support for the bureau because of this logic.

Late on the night of 29 June 1921, to chants of “Vote, vote” the measure was put to the House of Representatives.  After some wrangling over parliamentary procedure, a roll call vote passed the measure 201 to 123 with 2 voting present and 105 not voting.  The measure then moved to the Senate, where Senator Robert LaFollette(R-WI) introduced amendments to insure that the chief of the new bureau would be a qualified aviator.  The entire appropriations bill was sent to a conference committee and referred back to both houses for a vote.  It passed both houses by comfortable margins on 12 July 1921 and was signed into law by President Warren G. Harding on the next day.[47]

To Congress, the Bureau of Aeronautics mainly represented an efficiency measure that perhaps represented the further consolidation of aviation which seemed to be coming.  The relative lack of debate implied the measure itself evoked little interest one way or the other from most members of Congress.  If the Navy, and those Congressmen most informed on the decision, felt that a Bureau of Aeronautics would achieve greater results for less money then it was something to be created.  It would not, however, lead to significantly increased appropriations for naval aviation.