CHAPTER VI

THE NAVY IN THE LAMPERT COMMITTEE

AND MORROW BOARD HEARINGS

            1925 proved to be a pivotal year in American aviation history.  The push for an independent air force culminated in reports by two investigative bodies, the Congressional Lampert Committee and the Presidential Morrow Board.  These reports resulted in 1926 legislation that shaped the future of U. S. aviation through the Second World War.  Furthermore, this legislation insured that aviation would remain an integral part of the Navy and under its control.

            Before both of these committees, the Navy attempted to present a unified front in support of the Bureau of Aeronautics and in opposition to an independent air force. The Navy felt that allowing another service to gain control of either naval aviation operations or procurement would ultimately prove disastrous for the Navy.

            As the most outspoken proponent of an independent air service, Brigadier General William Mitchell, Assistant Chief, United States Army Air Service, was the Navy’s principal antagonist in both hearings.  Before the Lampert Committee, Mitchell trumpeted the power and advantages of air power, declaring,

Today air power absolutely determines the defensibility of the country.  If control of the air can be obtained and can be maintained by the country, it can prevent invasion of the country by either hostile land forces or sea forces and air forces.  It is the only element in a national defense that can do this alone and unassisted.[1]

Mitchell went on to insure the committee members that in addition to its power, aviation “...in the future promises the greatest civilizing element that we have in any present human activity....”[2] 

            Mitchell championed the cause of an independent air force, a new service that would control all military aviation, if not all aviation in the United States.  Mitchell charged that aviation’s growth in the United States had been hindered by poor leadership and organization.  The United States was falling behind other world powers in developing aviation, both commercially and for the military, and unless Congress took drastic action the trend could only continue.[3]

            Not surprisingly, Mitchell reserved his harshest criticism for the Navy, declaring naval warfare changed forever and that the surface ship virtually obsolete.  According to Mitchell, “No surface vessel can be built that can resist an air attack.”[4]  His statements paralleled many of those he had made previously, but the official setting made the charges seem much more damaging.  In addition to statements attacking the Navy’s control of aviation, Mitchell also leveled specific allegations of mismanagement and even illegalities.[5]

            While the legislation authorizing the Bureau of Aeronautics required its Chief and other officers in charge of aviation to be pilots or observers, Mitchell charged that most of the officers were “paper pilots,” qualified for aviation in name only.  And further that “...senior officers with no service in aviation are put in over officers who have served for years and have made their life work in aviation....”[6]  He argued that this reality, non-aviators in charge of aviation, constituted the primary limiting factor for naval aviation with the non-aviators serving “to retard the proper development of such service on account of their lack of knowledge of the requirements of aviation.”

            Mitchell argued that even the addition of the carriers Lexington and Saratoga, scheduled for completion in 1927, would leave the Navy far behind other naval powers.  Mitchell claimed that he had realized the need for the development of aircraft carriers early and pointed to his recommendation for conversion of the large passenger ships Leviathan and Great Northern into aircraft carriers in 1921.  According to Mitchell, the House Naval Affairs Committee rejected this proposal because of inaccurate information provided by the Navy.  In fact, the committee rejected Mitchell’s recommendation because of serious faults in the conversion plans.  His plan for the Leviathan included redesigning the hull to act like an accordion so that the ship could pass through the Panama Canal.[7]

            Finally, Mitchell alleged that the examples of other world powers, namely Great Britain, supported the creation of an independent air force.  According to him, these powers realized not only the power of aviation but also the tremendous savings on defense possible with the new technology.  Great Britain’s Royal Air Force established the country as the recognized leader in general and naval aviation.  Other, smaller nations chose to develop aviation as the cost effective alternative to massive battle fleets.  These countries, Mitchell felt, clearly showed the path the United States should follow for aviation.[8]

            Mitchell’s statements had a powerful effect on the committee.  His was the most recognized name in aviation in the United States at the time, and few of the committee members seemed willing to challenge him.  Instead a number of them, specifically Representative Frank Reid (IN) who would later defend Mitchell during his court martial, gave him opportunities to review his war record, recount the various bombing tests conducted since the war, and make extravagant claims with little supporting evidence.  Mitchell repeatedly exaggerated the money spent on aviation since the war and understated the number of modern aircraft in the Navy’s inventory.[9]

            Mitchell directed his testimony to the national media covering the hearings as much as he did to the committee members.  The hearings represented Mitchell’s best chance to decisively influence the American public in favor of an independent air force and he intended to take full advantage of the opportunity.  Never shy with the media, Mitchell repeated his charges, particularly that the other officers who supported aviation were being suppressed by the Navy and Army high command.  This allegation contained more than a modicum of truth as Mitchell himself faced serious censure because of his testimony before the committee.[10]

To refute Mitchell’s allegations and to insure continuation of the Bureau of Aeronautics, naval officers and other supporters developed a series of arguments.  First, they sought to reassure committee members that the Navy was developing an efficient naval aviation component.  Second, they reaffirmed their conviction that naval aviation was a key auxiliary, but only an auxiliary, to the Navy as a whole, clearly echoing the findings of the Eberle Board.  Third, they argued that naval aviators needed special training and that naval aircraft had to be specifically designed for duty at sea.  Fourth, Navy officers and supporters attacked advocates of an independent air force suggesting that they over emphasized the abilities of aircraft, misunderstood naval aviation, and acted in their own self-interest.  Finally, the Navy pointed to the examples of other countries, notably Great Britain, to support its contentions.[11]

            Rear Admiral William A. Moffett, Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics, served as the Navy’s primary spokesman during the hearings.  Moffett had inherited the Navy’s ongoing feud with Mitchell when he assumed his position in 1921.  Despite initial attempts at working with Mitchell to establish common ground in support of aviation, Moffett soon found himself participating in a very personal battle with the more outspoken Army officer.  Despite Moffett’s own concerns about support of aviation by senior officers, he felt that Mitchell posed the greater threat to naval aviation at the time and hence directed his efforts in that direction.  Moffett spent a considerable amount of his time as Bureau Chief refuting Mitchell’s allegations and by 1924 had developed a firm and efficient manner which focused on facts and relied on the expertise of his subordinates.[12]

Moffett began his testimony before the Lampert Committee by explaining the divided system of cognizance that had existed before the creation of the Bureau of Aeronautics. Decrying the prior system as inefficient and unwieldy, he stressed the improvement in having aviation concentrated in only one bureau.  He then went on to explain in detail how the Bureau operated and the number of external agencies with which it cooperated, in an attempt to deflect allegations of duplication of effort.  The Bureau followed a policy for aviation adopted by the General Board in 1922 which focused on developing aviation for use with the fleet.  Since the war, fleet aviation had become the Bureau’s principal task.[13]

            Moffett next focused on the cooperation between the Army and Navy, insisting that the two services coordinated closely on aviation matters.  He explained the work of the Joint Board of the Army and Navy and the joint aeronautics board.  He assured committee members that not only did the joint aeronautical board coordinate operations between the two services but it also avoided duplication in procurement in order to reduce costs.  The Navy sought to avoid duplication in effort, both internally and externally, to insure that the nation received maximum efficiency for its defense spending.[14]

            Moffett next addressed naval aviation’s advances in recent years, focusing on work done with the carrier Langley and the development of new airplanes.  Moffett conceded that naval aviation had not developed as rapidly as the rest of aviation had during the First World War.  Specifically, the Navy’s commitment to land based, anti-submarine warfare hindered the development of fleet aviation.  Thus, after the war the Navy had started from scratch with much of its development.  Now, Moffett declared, the U.S. Navy led the world in technological development.  Navy airplanes and pilots were equal to the best in the world with numerous world records to prove it.  According to him, “...we are so far ahead of everybody else that it is going to take them a long time to catch up....”[15]

It was only in terms of quantity that the United States lagged behind other nations.  This Moffett blamed on budget limitations rather than a lack of commitment by the Navy.  In addressing the budget, he also pointed out that independent air service supporters exaggerated the amount of money the Navy had received.  Mitchell and others claimed that more than $400,000,000 had been spent on aviation since the war, but Navy funding averaged less than $20,000,000.  Further, when compared with the best estimates of European spending, the Navy was developing aviation more efficiently than other nations.[16]

To support his testimony, Moffett called on a number of his subordinates, including Captain Edward G. Land, Commanders Keith Whiting, Marc Mitscher, and H. C. Richardson, and Lt. Commander Atlee Edwards, to testify in their areas of expertise.  These officers often provided specific testimony about specific questions the committee had already asked, particularly individual contracts or proposals.  Moffett remained present but largely silent during the testimony of his officers so that they could display their expertise and also as a way to refute Mitchell’s allegation that the opinions of junior officers were being suppressed by the Navy.[17]

Edwards began the Navy’s supporting case by emphasizing the role that naval aviation played in the First World War.  He based his testimony on his personal experience as a member of Admiral William Sims’ staff.  According to Edwards, the role played by naval aviation was larger than was generally recognized.  Early problems with supply had hindered anti-submarine efforts, but once the Navy corrected these problems the patrol planes based on the English and Irish coast had performed their anti-submarine role effectively.  Unfortunately, as Edwards pointed out, patrolling for submarines attracted little press attention and hence the true effort of the Navy in this vital task remained largely unrecognized by the American public and many members of Congress.  He acknowledged mistakes made by the Navy, but pointed to the extreme difficulties encountered and the eventual success of the effort.  According to Edwards, the Navy’s efforts would have paid considerably greater dividends had the war continued into 1919, a view shared by a number of American naval officers and historians.[18]

            Finally, Edwards attempted to provide insight into the creation of the Royal Air Force, the example most often pointed to by Mitchell and others, and the problems created by this system of control.  Edwards testified that:  “The reaction which I experienced from close and intimate contact with officials of the British Government before, during, and after the amalgamation was that this move was in the nature of a temporary expedient designed to meet an emergency situation.”[19]  He continued “Subsequent events have proven how very unsatisfactory this arrangement is to the Navy.  No man can serve two masters, nor can two masters direct the efforts of [one] man effectively.”  These observations led him to conclude that “the creation of a separate air force has been far from a satisfactory solution as is evidenced by the fact that ever since its creation it has been the subject of bitter controversy.”[20]

To support his contention, he provided a 1924 report titled “The Navy and the Air Force” prepared by the British National and Imperial Defense Committee.  Read into the record, the report stopped short of recommending a return to a divided system of control but did acknowledge the serious damage done to naval aviation by its inclusion into the Royal Air Force.  The Royal Air Force had failed to adequately provide for the aviation requirements of the fleet since the war.  The Admiralty also remained concerned that in future wars the fleet would be stripped of its aviation component to provide reserves for the Royal Air Force.  The report recommended a number of changes in the current command structure of naval aviation, including additional naval authority over shipboard operations, but left many important decisions to ministry officials, such as what percentage of the Royal Air Force budget needed to be dedicated to naval aviation.[21]  

            Edwards used the report and other British publications to support the contention that Great Britain had made a mistake when it established the Royal Air Force with total control over aviation.  Like in the United States, there was in Great Britain an ongoing debate over aviation policy, but while the United States discussed establishing an independent air force some in Great Britain were suggesting that naval aviation be returned to the Navy’s control.  Edwards cited a 9 September 1924 editorial in the London Morning Post extolling the virtues of the American system.  According to the Morning Post, “...their Navy is organized for war with a proper air branch of its own while ours is not.”[22]

Following Edwards’ testimony, Captain Land addressed the committee along similar lines.  Land argued that Great Britain had made a serious mistake in establishing a single service to oversee all aviation and that the United States possessed a superior system for developing naval aviation.  Placing his objections in succinct form, Land argued:

The serious objections, very briefly, to a united air service are lack of unit contact;  lack of proper training;  lack of doctrinal training in a branch;  the differences in construction;  the difficulty in procurement of construction under contracts, are radically different for the different ships that are used by the Navy air service as compared to the Army air service;  the lack of education and experience in development of men, and making them a jack of all trades;  the lack of logistics;  and a marked increase in cost with a decrease in efficiency.[23]

            Two days later the naval officers returned and Commander Whiting took the lead in addressing the committee.  Because of the committee’s interest in the examples of other nations, he provided details on the organization of aviation in France, Italy, and Japan.  In each case he stressed the advantages of the United States’ system in comparison to the other countries.  He also noted that Japan had recently considered adapting the Royal Air Force model and rejected the idea.  Without elaborating, Whiting suggested that Japan rejected a united air force because of objections similar to those being raised by the Navy.[24]

            What Whiting was willing to elaborate on was the Navy’s objections to an independent air force.  Principally, the objection was based on the concept of command and control, who would decide how much aviation the navy needed, and who would control that aviation when it operated with the fleet.  Whiting identified a number of scenarios in which questions could arise and the difficulties that would result, such as who would make the decision to launch a strike from a carrier and at what point in time that strike should be launched.  He also questioned the intent of aviation enthusiasts, noting that some proponents of an independent air force had suggested that the new service would assume command over the new carriers Lexington and Saratoga once they were launched.  Removing the carriers from Navy control, Whiting declared, “...would be fatal to the Navy.”[25]

            During questioning by committee members, Whiting continued to defend the existing system.  Responding to the allegation of duplication of effort, he pointed to the Joint Aeronautical Board and explained that both the Army and Navy submitted their aircraft requirements and then “...it is discussed there, as to where those planes should be obtained.” As to the concerns of the aviation industry, Whiting noted that if Congress would commit itself to a long term procurement schedule of five or ten years then “...there would be no trouble as far as the industry is concerned.  They would know exactly how much money would be available each year, and they would build to meet it.”[26]

            Whiting’s proposal seemed to interest several committee members who questioned him and Moffett about the possibility of establishing a long term procurement program.  Moffett assured the committee that the Bureau of Aeronautics was capable of projecting the Navy’s aviation needs that far in advance, “...we can tell within a few hundred dollars what we need from year to year.”[27]  He also suggested that a five year plan would allow the Navy to procure aircraft at a cheaper per unit cost, thus saving money.  Finally, a commitment from Congress for long term procurement would allow the Navy to develop more comprehensive plans and establish stability in military planning.  As Whiting concluded, American aviation “...requires a definite program, over a certain number of years, and the maintaining of a certain sized force in the Army and the Navy, and encouragement of commercial aviation.”[28]

            Commander Marc A. Mitscher was the last of the junior officers to appear on behalf of the Navy before the Lampert Committee.  Mitscher limited his testimony to the questions of Army versus Navy responsibility for defense and the differences in aircraft design for the two services in an attempt to assure committee members that the existing system avoided costly duplication.  Using the agreements established during World War I as a basis, Army and Navy panels in 1920 and 1923 revised the guidelines which differentiated the aviation duties between the two services.  The current guidelines outlined the role of naval aviation as:

Naval aircraft, operations from mobile floating bases or from naval air stations on shore in cooperation with the fleet:

            (a) As an arm of the fleet.

            (b) For overseas scouting.

(c) Against enemy establishments on shore when such operations are conducted in cooperation with other types of naval forces, or alone when their mission is primarily naval.

            (1) Reconnaissance and patrol of coastal sea areas.

            (2) Convoy operations.

(3) Attack on enemy submarine, aircraft or surface vessels engaged in trade prevention or in passage through the sea area.

(4) In cooperation with the Army against enemy vessels engaged in attacks on the coast.[29]

This agreement insured that, despite Mitchell’s allegations, the Navy was well within its rights and responsibilities to build and maintain shore stations and land based patrol aircraft.

            In addition to the distinction in duties between the two services, Mitscher and Commander Richardson also pointed out the differences in their aircraft specifications.  Navy and Army aircraft were designed differently, with naval aircraft needing additional strength for carrier landings, special weather treatment to withstand exposure to salt water, and provisions for ditching if necessary.   All of this came at a price, with naval aircraft often sacrificing range and speed in return.  For this reason, it was not possible for a single design to be ideal for both the Army and Navy.  It also meant that most land based aircraft possessed superior performance to naval aircraft and trying to compare the aircraft of the two services was extremely difficult.[30]

            Taken as a whole, the testimony and statements of these officers made a compelling case for the Navy’s continued control of aviation.  Unlike the bombastic Mitchell, Moffett and his officers relied on the weight of evidence to support their arguments.  By demonstrating their expertise in aviation they also defused one of Mitchell’s most serious charges, the Navy’s general incompetence in regards to aviation.  Moffett presented the committee with a core group of dedicated, young officers committed to continuing the development of aviation within the Navy as a clear statement that naval aviation in its current form had a bright future.

            While these junior officers provided detailed testimony on the Navy and its aviation component, Moffett worked hard to insure that additional information was available to the committee if members needed it.  After each day of testimony, Moffett forwarded any reports or other material he felt relevant to the members.  These additions included a listing of the all of the Navy’s aviation contracts since the war, of all the officers currently serving in the Bureau of Aeronautics, and complete copies of all the laws pertaining to the Bureau.  In each case, Moffett was leaving nothing to chance by making sure that the committee had all of the correct information instead of relying on misinformation from Bureau opponents.[31]

            Finally, Moffett was able to call on the support of President Calvin Coolidge and his administration.  Coolidge publicly and privately opposed the creation of an independent air force and found Mitchell and his actions particularly annoying.  While Coolidge chose not to testify before the committee, both Secretary of the Navy Curtis Wilbur, and Secretary of War John W. Weeks, appeared before the committee to voice their support for the current divided system of control.  Wilbur made his opposition clear the first time he appeared before the committee, declaring “...the officers in the department[of the Navy] are almost unanimous in their opposition to a united Air Service, and that has been my own view and is now.”[32]  He continued “...personally, I can see no advantage whatever in uniting the two services...I should regard it as a very disastrous thing not to have a separate [naval] Air Service.”[33]  Weeks, for his part, added “I would object to that course when we come to a conjunction of the two Air Services....”[34]

            Despite the weight of the Navy’s evidence, it became apparent that the Congressmen favored the idea of an independent air force.  Statements made to the press by committee members consistently pointed to a deficiency in the air service which the members felt would best be corrected by establishing a new service.  Representative Randolph Perkins(D-NJ) told the New York Times:

This investigation grew out of complaints against the air services, and its primary function is to see whether our air forces are what they ought to be.  It is the consensus of officials we have examined and of members of this committee that they fall far short of being what they should be.[35]

The Navy, therefore, faced the very real threat that Congress might create a new service, the Air Force, and remove aviation from its control.  Before that happened, however, the Navy would get one more chance to present its case, and this time the body would be both more informed and considerably more friendly.[36]

The Navy’s chief antagonist, Mitchell, was a changed man by the time he appeared before the Morrow Board.  Because of his continued criticism of the Army’s leadership and the Coolidge administration, Mitchell was facing an almost certain court martial.  Despite a strong contingent of supporters, including Congressmen Frank Reid and Fiorello LaGuardia, Mitchell was almost certain to be convicted, a verdict which would mean the end of his military career.  Already removed from his command, he appeared before the Board largely beaten but unbowed.[37] 

Perhaps aware that he was facing a more experienced panel, Mitchell presented a more conservative view of aviation before the Morrow Board, there describing it as “...a vital element in national defense...”[38] rather than the only element necessary.  Still, he maintained his conclusions about the lack of a future for the battleship in modern warfare.  He elaborated at length on this view, stating:

Air power’s effect on a navy, however, will entirely change all methods and means formerly used by sea forces.  To begin with, no surface vessels can exist wherever air forces acting from land bases are able to attack them.  This is because-

(a)  A surface vessel can not conceal itself from view of aircraft.

(b)  Ariel weapons-the bomb, mines, chemical weapons, air and water torpedoes, and gunfire-can destroy and completely put out of action at a minimum cost and effort any surface vessel that has been built or that can be built.

(c)  There is no efficient means of defense against aircraft from the vessels themselves, either by missile-throwing weapons, balloon, or other barrages, or chemical weapons.

(d)  A surface navy can not operate aircraft from floating bases against aircraft acting from land bases successfully because the platform available for launching the airplanes is so small, contracted, unstable, and exposed to hostile air attack that neither sufficient nor suitable aircraft can be launched from them to cope with air forces acting from shore bases.

The future of naval arrangements will, therefore, be confined, for offensive purposes, to vessels capable of diving below the surface of the water to conceal themselves from view and attack.[39]

His arguments carried less weight with the Morrow Board than they had with the Lampert Committee and unlike before he was not called back to appear repeatedly.

            Once            again Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics William Moffett was designated as the chief spokesman for the Navy.  This time, however, he accepted the position with considerably more hesitation.  His continuing problems with the Navy’s senior officers and the recent embarrassments, the Shenandoah and trans-Pacific flight, had badly shaken Moffett’s confidence in the Navy’s ability to develop aviation.  Before appearing before the board, Moffett called upon his friend John Victory, Secretary of the National Advisory Committee for Aviation(NACA) the precursor to NASA.[40] 

In a conversation at Moffett’s home lasting into the wee hours of the morning, Victory and Moffett discussed the future of naval aviation.  Moffett showed Victory two sets of reports, one supporting the status quo and the other advocating an independent air force.  Moffett faced the most critical decision of his career, to continue to support the Bureau of Aeronautics or to switch sides and join his nemesis Mitchell.  According to Victory, Moffett finally concluded that the officers who were restricting aviation’s development would be retiring in the not too distant future and would be replaced by junior officers more interested in developing aviation.  Therefore, he decided to continue his support of naval aviation controlled by the Navy and the Bureau of Aeronautics.[41]

            In testimony before the Morrow Board, Moffett repeated many of the same points he had emphasized during the Lampert Committee hearings but tailored them to a more sophisticated audience.  He presented a more comprehensive history of naval aviation in the United States and of the Bureau of Aeronautics.  He also supplied a more thorough explanation of the functioning of the bureau and the responsibilities of naval aviation under agreements with the Army.  To insure that duplication remained at a minimum, the two services maintained a Joint Army and Navy Aeronautical Board.  According to Moffett, “All matters of procurement and purchase of aircraft and the estimates for the appropriations for the Army and Navy aviation programs are presented to this board for review and recommendation before submission to Congress.”[42]

In testimony before the Lampert Committee and the Morrow Board, and in public statements, Mitchell had charged that the mere existence of Navy air fields violated U.S. law since all land based aircraft were legally controlled by the Army.  Moffett regarded these allegations as particularly misleading and offensive.  He attacked these charges by citing the relative laws which permitted the Navy to maintain shore installations and then he turned to simple common sense.  The Navy needed land bases for training and routine maintenance, it was not possible to do all of that at sea.  If the Navy could not maintain shore installations, then it would be unable to develop naval aviation.  “Naval aircraft bases on shore are as necessary to naval aircraft as navy yards are to ships.”[43]  Moffett emphasized that these air bases, like aviation itself, formed a key component of a balanced fleet, just like submarines or fuel ships.

In response to questions from the board, Moffett detailed the Navy’s current aviation strength in terms of men, planes, and bases.  At the time, 623 officers and more than 3,000 enlisted men were assigned to naval aviation.  These officers and men supported 860 planes, with 177 more currently on order, of which 130 were deployed with the fleet.  Despite the lack of aircraft carriers, only the largely experimental U.S.S. Langley being operational at the time, Moffett claimed this number was unequaled by any other nation.  To support this commitment to naval aviation the Navy maintained heavier than air training at Pensacola, FL, lighter than air training at Lakehurst, NJ, and specialized training programs at Great Lakes, IL, Philadelphia, PA, San Diego, CA, and Anacostia, D.C.  Taken together, the Navy possessed an extensive and well established naval aviation component.[44]

            In front of the Lampert Committee, Moffett, and the other naval officers, had been careful not to accuse Congress of not appropriating enough money, but in these hearings he made a case that naval aviation was underfunded.  In the years following the war, appropriations had remained fairly steady but at a level significantly below that requested, see Table 6 below.

Table 6

Naval Aviation Funding, 1923-1926[45]

These figures did not include appropriations for the aircraft carriers Saratoga and Lexington which were funded separately.  Even with that additional money, Congressional appropriations lagged far behind the Bureau’s requests.

Moffett directly addressed the question of a fundamental change in naval aviation’s structure several times during his testimony.  At each point he directly rejected the creation of an independent air service, declaring “This plan is unsound strategically, tactically, and economically.  The organization of single air service would fatally complicate the national defense problem.”[46]  He also rejected the renewed suggestion for creating an aviation corps within the Navy analogous to the Marine Corps.  For naval aviation to develop into a strong force for national defense, it had to remain within the Navy.  Moffett summarized his views: 

Naval aviation is an integral part of the fleet.  Naval aircraft must go to sea on the backs of the fleet.  This requires that naval aircraft be designed to operate under the peculiar conditions which pertain to the fleet.  It further requires that naval aviation personnel be officers and enlisted men of the Navy trained and indoctrinated in the basic principles of naval warfare and skilled in the basic principles of naval warfare and skilled in naval tactics.  The Navy and naval aviation are mutually interdependent.  The fundamental strategic and tactical requirements for the employment of the fleet is unity--unity of command, unity of effort, and unity of spirit.  This is a basic conception which makes the Navy and naval aviation one and inseparable.[47]

Unlike the Lampert Committee hearings, the Navy’s senior officers and senior officials carried much of the burden of testifying in this second set of hearings.  These officers included Admiral E. W. Eberle, the Chief of Naval Operation, Admiral Joseph Strauss, head of the General Board, and Secretary of the Navy Wilbur.  Each of these gentlemen sought to reinforce Moffett’s testimony and defend the Bureau of Aeronautics.  They also sought to impress upon the board members that the Navy’s senior officers strongly supported naval aviation, contrary to Mitchell’s complaints.  The New York Times noted:  “The naval contingent appearing at today’s session presented a solid front in its offensive against the Mitchell plan of unification...and that under no circumstances should their operations be combined into an independent entity.”[48] 

Appearing first, Secretary Wilbur emphasized the same unity concept introduced by Moffett.  He began by introducing the long line of Navy studies which insisted that control of aviation must remain within the Navy.  He then cited additional studies conducted by other government agencies, including the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, and foreign powers which all concluded that a divided system of control was superior to a unified air service.  Taken together, these studies presented compelling evidence in support of the Navy’s position.  To the weight of these studies, Wilbur added his own opinions.  Naval aviation could not be “divorced from the Navy” because it “...is an integral part of the very fabric of the Navy itself.”[49]

Admiral E. W. Eberle appeared before the board as the Chief of Naval Operations but was able to add his experience from chairing the Eberle Board, a Navy board which had established official Navy aviation policy in 1924.  He reassured the board members that aviation received considerable support from his office and occupied a place of considerable importance in the Navy’s organization.  Not only did the Bureau of Aeronautics hold equal status with the other Navy bureaus, but the Bureaus of Ordnance, Navigation, and Yards and Docks all maintained sections strictly devoted to supporting aviation.  Eberle reasserted the idea of aviation being integrated into the Navy as the only means for insuring a strong and efficient force.  As a caveat, however, he added:

Aviation is in its infancy and has great possibilities and also limitations.  The present state of its development and its achievements do not warrant all the extravagant claims set forth.  This is not the time to experiment with our national defense forces, but rather for sane and progressive development of new weapons and elements of warfare and their consolidation with the other fighting units of the Army and the Navy.[50]

            The presence of the Navy’s senior officers did not preclude the testimony of junior officers most interested in aviation.  Mitscher, Whiting, Towers, and the other junior officers who had appeared before the Lampert Committee also appeared before the Morrow Board, but here their testimony was relegated to a secondary status instead of the preeminent role it had played earlier.  They also appear to have been more honest before the Morrow Board, openly acknowledging discontent among the aviation officers.  They also, however, admitted that Admiral Eberle had been largely correct when he had earlier declared that the greatest immediate result from creating an independent air service or an aviation corps within the Navy would be “...a large number of promotions for the aviation officers.”[51]

            Despite the Navy’s best, and largely successful, efforts to present a completely united front before both inquiries, there were some defectors from the Navy’s ranks.  Admiral William S. Sims, former commander of the United States forces in Europe during the First World War, emerged as the primary dissident.  A vocal critic of Navy policy since the end of the war, Sims attacked the Navy’s development of aviation as unacceptable but also rejected the creation of an independent air force.  The future of naval warfare lay in the air and not in the battleship, but only if the pilots flying the planes were also naval officers first and aviators second.  The Navy had to control aviation and use that control to develop the aircraft carrier as the principal weapon of naval warfare.  As Sims, explained “...the airplane carrier is a stronger capital ship than the battleship;  because the airplane carrier, meeting the battleship out at sea,...would defeat it inevitably.”[52]

            Before the Morrow Board, Sims again assailed the Navy’s current policy, elaborating on his objections in a series of arguments:

  The Navy Department’s air policy.  It is well known that it has no definite policy and no real organization.  The assertions of the Navy Department are briefly as follows:

  The battleship is the backbone of the fleet.

  A fleet air force is an auxiliary.

  The battleship can defend itself against airplanes.

  Bombs can not disable a modern battleship.

  A fleet should be well balanced.

  That, of course, is a distinctively defensive policy.

  The airmen assert:

  A fleet air force is not an auxiliary, but a major force.

  Planes that command the air can sink or disable any ship.

  The fleet air force should be such as to command the air over the enemy fleet.

  Our policy should be command of the air, not a ‘well-balanced fleet.’

  A ‘well-balanced fleet’ has no definite meaning.  Like all similar phrases, it is dangerous.

  The airmen’s policy is a distinctively aggressive one.

  Manifestly, the decision as to the kind of air force we need depends upon the question as the offensive properties of the airplane and the defensive properties of the battleship.[53]

Sims acknowledged his problems with the Navy’s senior officials, declaring former Secretary of the Navy Joshephus Daniels “...a man I personally liked—officially not quite so much...,” and Edwin Denby, “...a man who did not like trouble, and he said that he did not intend to make any trouble in the Navy Department....”[54]  He declared Wilbur much like Denby, and the current group of senior officers, Chief of Naval Operations, the members of the General Board, and the Bureau Chiefs, the “Daniels Cabinet.”  As long as the officers, most of whom Sims noted had not passed through the Navy’s War College, remained in control of the Navy aviation would remain a secondary concern.  As an example, Sims pointed to the Eberle Board and its conclusions:

The Secretary began the investigation by announcing himself that the battleship is the backbone of the fleet, and all the rest of it.  The Secretary then appoints as a special board the General Board and a few additional members, and the General Board reports that battleship is the backbone of the fleet, and all the rest of it.  This is an investigation in a circle, and as stated in an editorial in the Washington Post it could get nowhere, and it did not.[55]

But, Sims also informed both investigative groups that removing aviation would be disastrous for the nation’s defense.  He commended Mitchell for bringing attention to the question of aviation but also declared him “overenthusiastic” in his support for an independent air force.  Naval aviation, he repeatedly declared, had to remain a part of the Navy to be effective and could not be removed from the Navy’s control.  Sims instead proposed the creation of a Department of Defense to oversee the Army and the Navy to insure maximum efficiency and effectiveness, but with each service maintaining its own air component.[56]

            While Sims was the most noted Navy officer to testify as a hostile witness before the two committees, he was certainly not the only one.  A number of junior officers also chose to present their complaints, some of which bordered on the petty and bizarre.  Lieutenant Clifton Sprague openly complained about the slow rate of promotions for air officers, and also about some 25 officers in the Bureau of Aeronautics offices receiving flight pay.  Lieutenant George Henderson objected to serving under non-aviation officers and hence advocated the aviation corps concept.  Lieutenant Lester Thomas Hunt provided the most petty of the aviators’ complaints, namely that the white collars on the Navy’s uniforms were impossible to keep clean during air operations.[57]

            At the conclusion of the Morrow Board hearings, the Navy felt that it would receive a favorable recommendation from the group, certainly more favorable than was likely to be returned by the Lampert Committee.  The ultimate decision on the fate of the Bureau of Aeronautics, however, lay with Congress.  A Congress which would weigh not only the arguments of Mitchell and the Navy, but also of the growing aviation industry.  An industry which had appeared in mass during both sets of hearings and which was placing a great deal of pressure on Congress to provide additional funding for aviation, both civil and military.