CHAPTER VIII

CONGRESS 1924-1926

            By late Fall 1925 both the Lampert Committee and the Morrow Board had concluded their hearings and staff members began drafting reports.  On 30 November, less than six weeks after hearing its last witness, the Morrow Board presented its report to the President.  Two weeks later, the Lampert Committee submitted its report directly to Congress.  Not surprisingly, the two reports reached separate conclusions about the future of aviation and recommended different courses of action.[1]

            The members of the Morrow Board opened their report with a disclaimer about the testimony it had received.  The Board had drawn on the previous investigations as well as the testimony presented to it directly.  From this testimony, the board concluded that the most certain thing was the uncertainty of information.  The members complained that they had received vastly different testimony about a wide variety of subjects, including

...the number of usable airplanes under the control of the United States Army and Navy;  as to the number of airplanes in use by other first class powers;  as to the effect of bombing and of antiaircraft fire;  as to the physical possibilities of aircraft in carrying bombs and the distance they can be carried;  as to the extent of the civilian use of aircraft here and abroad;  as to the extent of industrial preparedness here and abroad.[2]

            Despite the varied opinions expressed during the testimony, the Board came to a number of clear conclusions about America’s development of aviation.  First, the country had completely failed to support aviation prior to the First World War.  Once the war began, the military and industry both performed Herculean efforts in preparing aviation for the war, but that the war ended before the program could reach fruition, thus leaving the impression that it had actually failed.  The Board acknowledged that the program had failed to meet expectations but refused to call the entire program a failure.  The report also refused to assign blame for aviation’s problems to a single source or individual, noting that a wide variety of factors contributed to the problem.  The report chastised those individuals who had spent so much time, and money, since the war attempting to assign blame and establish their viewpoint as the dominant one, noting:

What is needed is a more generous appreciation by each side of the difficulties of the other side.  On each side there is need of patience with what seems the unreasonableness of the other side.  The fundamental problem may not be settled.  It may, however, be understood if men will approach it with less feeling and more intelligence.[3]

            The report then turned its attention to what it regarded as the six broad questions of modern American aviation’s structure.  The first of these dealt with the relation between the military and civilian air services.  The Board concluded that historically the United States had maintained a clear distinction between civilian and military functions.  It felt that establishing a single department to oversee both civilian and military aviation would violate this principal.  In particular, the report argued that the current push towards arms limitations would be endangered if America’s civil and military aviation were united under a single department.  Therefore, the report rejected the idea of a cabinet level department of aviation as fundamentally damaging to both civil and military aviation.[4]

            The second question addressed government support of civilian aviation.  The report concluded that the government could best support civilian aviation in the same manner that is supported shipping and other transportation networks.  This meant assisting with the development of infrastructure and navigation aids which would allow commercial aviation to become a viable transportation alternative.

The third question was “What should be the military air policy of the United States?”  Here the Board deferred to the Congress and the military, noting that the policy changed over time and was dependent on the national budget and military need.  However, it did put to rest the allegations that the United States was in imminent danger of invasion or attack, noting that no potential enemy possessed bases from which current aircraft could reach the continental United States and that there were no designs under development capable of attacking the United States from across either of the great oceans.  This third question led directly to the fourth, “Is the United States in danger of air attack from any potential enemy of menacing strength?”  To which the committee replied succinctly, “Our answer to this question is no.”[5] 

            The fifth and sixth questions directly addressed the creation of a separate air service, in the case of the fifth question under a Department of Defense and in the sixth as a separate department equivalent to those of War and the Navy.  In both cases, the Board rejected the idea of further modifying the current system.  The benefits of any change would be more than offset by the increased complexity and difficulties in command and control which would surely be experienced in wartime.  It noted that senior officers of both the Army and the Navy were united in their opposition, and that they represented the greatest concentration of military knowledge possessed by the nation.  The reported also noted that the example of the Royal Air Force still remained inconclusive, and that even its existence continued to be a point of debate in Great Britain.[6]

            Next, the report turned to its recommendations, arranging them into three groups, for the Army, the Navy, and the aircraft industry.  For the Navy, the Board recognized the great work already undertaken by the Navy to develop naval aviation.  It acknowledged the world records established by the Navy in terms of first takeoff and landing on a ship, and the great work done since the war in experiments onboard the aircraft carrier Langley.  However, the Board also pointed to a number of personnel problems which continued to plague naval aviation and the continued lack of experienced aviators in positions of command throughout the Navy.[7]

            To correct these problems, and to establish the United States as a preeminent naval power, the Board made twelve recommendations.  First, the Board called for the creation of an additional Assistant Secretary of the Navy to handle aviation and give it a greater voice within the Department of the Navy.  The second through fourth, and eighth and ninth recommendations dealt with personnel questions.  The system of advancement in the Navy needed to be modified to accommodate those naval officers who devoted their careers to aviation, but not to the extent that these officers were no longer qualified for general Navy duty.  Other recommendations, six and seven, urged the Navy to insure that naval aviators were present at all levels of command to insure that their views were adequately represented.  The rest of recommendations dealt with attracting qualified officers and enlisted men to aviation by offering increased pay and other incentives.[8]

            Concerning industry, the Board noted “The importance of the aircraft industry in relation to national defense is obvious.”  It acknowledged that the aviation industry could not be maintained at wartime levels during peace, there was simply no justification for that large of an industry.  For wartime purposes, however, it was imperative that the United States maintain a strong central core of aircraft manufacturers.  This core would provide the military’s peacetime needs, develop advanced designs, and be the basis for wartime expansion.  The report considered some of the problems encountered by the industry to be temporary, such as the dumping of surplus equipment on the market, while others, the question of proprietary rights, for instance, needed to dealt with on a permanent basis.[9]

            To improve conditions within the industry, the report made seven recommendations designed to improve stability and efficiency.  The Board recommended:

 (1)  The adoption of a policy of continuity in orders and of a standard rate of replacement.

 (2)  Production orders given only to companies which maintain design staffs of reasonable size and keep them active.

 (3)  Proprietary rights in design be fully recognized.

(4)  Governmental competition with the civil industry in production and activity be eliminated except in those projects impracticable or realization by the civil industry.

(5)  During a period of production of a type accepted as standard there be placed a succession of small orders for experimental designs to be given limited service tests, the best of these designs produced during a two or three year period being adopted as the next standard.  Such orders, distributed among firms having design and productions staffs of proven competence, should be awarded at a liberal price, high enough to cover all the overhead expense involved in the upkeep of the design and experimental departments.

(6)  Existing statutes covering the procurement of supplies and requiring competitive bidding be modified when necessary to allow putting the recommendations previously made into effect.

(7)  Governmental research in aeronautic science be actively continued and the testing facilities of the various department agencies should be made readily available to the civil industry.  The functions of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics should be extended to cover the field of advice to inventors regarding aeronautic inventions.[10]

            These recommendations met many of the requests of the industry.  If followed, they would mean stable orders for the companies capable, and willing, to push the envelope of aeronautical development.  Recognition of proprietary rights and reasonable prices would allow companies to undertake and finance experimental projects for military or civil aviation.  The removal of government competition, namely the Naval Aircraft Factory in Philadelphia, and additional access to the N.A.C.A.’s testing facilities, namely the Langley Aeronautical Research Center, promised to promote industry strength and diversity.

            The Morrow Board report presented a solid base of reform for naval aviation and for its relation to the industry.  If acted upon by Congress, naval aviation would remain within the Navy as the Bureau of Aeronautics.  The additional Assistant Secretary of the Navy and changes in promotion criteria would insure that aviation received more attention and a greater voice in Navy decisions.  Changes in the procurement laws would allow the Navy to develop a better, and stronger, relationship with the aviation industry and to encourage the development of designs ideally suited for the Navy’s needs.  All of this could only take place, however, if Congress acted upon the Board’s recommendations, and the House’s own investigation had yet to issue its report.

             Two weeks later, on 14 December, the Lampert Committee presented its report to the House.  The Lampert Report, less than half the length of the Morrow Report, also began with an assessment of the record of aviation during the war.  Based on all the testimony collected since the war, the Committee found that there was no evidence of corruption or misconduct by U.S. military officers or by industry representatives.  The contracts awarded during the war had not resulted in excessive profits, but in fact had left the industry struggling for its existence afterwards.  As a corollary, the Aircraft Manufacturer’s Association’s actions during the war had not violated American law, constituted a monopoly, or greatly increased the cost of the war.  Without providing an alternative explanation for the failure of the air programs during the war, the report had exonerated those most often blamed for its shortcomings.[11]

            In regards to current expenditures, the Committee found that critics had greatly exaggerated the amount of money being spent on aviation and specifically on new aircraft.  Most money being expended by the military on aviation, both by the Army and the Navy, was in fact used for training, operations, and maintenance, with only an average of 10% being expended on new aircraft.  The report also concluded that the amount of surplus material, and its usefulness, had been greatly exaggerated as well.  As a result of these inflated estimates, the expectations placed upon both services had greatly exceeded the resources expended upon them and led to a deterioration of morale among aviation personnel.[12]

            The committee found that neither service possessed a cohesive aviation policy.  This lack of policy resulted largely from uncertainty about the role and effectiveness of aviation and led to duplication of effort by the two services in a number of areas.  Because of established procedures, both services discriminated in promotions against aviators.  The lack of promotion opportunities for aviators not only lowered their morale, but also reduced the number of senior officers who were qualified as aviators and who could represent the technology at the upper levels of command.[13]

            The committee, as had the Morrow Board, regarded a strong aviation industry as essential for national defense.  However, it found that a number of factors had combined to reduce the industry to dangerously low levels.  These factors included:

             (a)  Lack of continuity in Government orders.

 (b)  Losses on Government contracts, both experimental and production.

             (c)  Direct competition by Government plants.

             (d)  Failure to recognize and protect design rights.

             (e)  A destructive system of competitive bidding.

 (f)  Discouragement of enterprise and individual efforts as the result of more than 20 investigations of various sorts in a period of 8 years.

(g)  Lack of confidence and mutual understanding among contractors themselves.

(h)  Failure of the industry to develop commercial and export trade.[14]

It is interesting to note that the Committee acknowledged the damage done by investigations like its own, and that many of aviation’s problems stemmed directly from government actions.

            The Lampert Committee’s report concluded with a list of twenty-three recommendations to achieve a more sound, effective, and efficient air service and industry.  Included among those directly affecting naval aviation were recommendations for major changes in procurement policy, the procurement and command structures, and the establishment of a long term procurement schedule.  The report stopped short of calling for the creation of an independent air service, but instead proposed the establishment of a “single department of national defense, headed by a civilian secretary, specially charged with the coordination of the defense of the country.”[15]  In addition, it recommended that in all government agencies responsibility for procurement and operations be separated, with a single government agency established to manage all aircraft procurement duties for government agencies, civil and military.

            For procurement law, the report recommended that the government recognize proprietary rights for all designs.  The report also called for the government to establish a simplified method of patent resolution.  The report concluded that the current system of appeals to the Court of Claims took too long and was too expensive for independent inventors.  Further, it said, the government should move to reduce, or completely do away with, the competitive bidding process.  Finally, the report proposed that the government assist in industry’s acquisition of noncommercial supplies, but what exactly these were was unspecified.[16]

            To provide long term stability for the industry, the report called on both the Army and the Navy to develop five year procurement plans.  These plans would include a minimum expenditure of $10,000,000 for each service, with all of the money being spent with civilian firms.  As a corollary, the report called for more aggressive system to determine obsolete, or expendable, aircraft.  Further, it recommended a halt to competition from the Naval Aircraft Factory and the Army facility at McCook Field in either the manufacture or maintenance of aircraft.[17]

            Taken as a whole, the Lampert Committee report was more far reaching than that of the Morrow Board and would have radically changed the United States’ aviation and military bureaucracy had it been adapted.  The Departments of War and the Navy would be merged into a single department of defense.  Technically, each service would continue to control its own aviation operations, but procurement would have been invested in another agency.  This new agency, whose position and composition was never fully addressed, would have controlled not only military procurement, but also all other government aircraft purchases.  These purchases would be made according to five year plans, with funding at a certain level assured for each year.  Again, however, the ultimate decision rested with Congress and debate over these two reports and their recommendations would begin in early 1926.

            When Congress convened in January 1926, it began consideration of the two reports and what action Congress would take.  Mitchell and La Guardia still retained hope for the creation of an independent air service, despite the fact that neither report had endorsed such an organization.  For the Navy’s part, supporters such as Vinson and Representative Thomas S. Butler(R-PA), Chairman of the House Naval Affairs Committee, hastened to introduce legislation to follow through on the recommendations of the Morrow Board.  Surprisingly, they met opposition from an unexpected source, the Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics Admiral William Moffett.[18]

            Vinson, Butler, and Secretary of the Navy Curtis Wilbur wanted to introduce a cost effective, fiscally conservative five year procurement plan.  Moffett, however, stubbornly insisted of including a replacement for the lost Shenandoah.  Moffett had become enamored with the idea of a metal clad dirigible even larger than the Shenandoah and was unwilling to accept an appropriations bill without the airship being included.  The disagreement became public when Wilbur and Moffett testified on back-to-back days before the Naval Affairs Committee in regards to the Navy’s 1927 appropriations.  Speculation in the newspapers even suggested that Moffett might soon follow Mitchell in facing court martial for his public disagreement with Wilbur.[19]

            Rather than allow a public disagreement on the matter to supply ammunition to opponents, the Naval Affairs Committee passed the appropriations bill without any provision for aviation.  The committee delayed consideration of the new airship and aviation until further hearings could be held, or more appropriately until Moffett and Wilbur could hammer out an agreement and present a unified front before Congress.  Moffett returned to the committee in early February and presented a new five year plan worked out by Bureau member Lt. Commander John Gunnell.[20]

            Under the revised plan, the Navy would have purchased 2,102 airplanes at a cost of almost $134,000,000.  When completed, the Navy’s aircraft strength would have stabilized at 1,248 planes.  The committee pared down the program so that it reached only 1,000 planes in five years, 1931, and cost only $85,000,000, consideration of the purchase of airships was left for a later measure.  Butler introduced the bill into the House as H.R. 9453 on 17 February.  Unfortunately, the size of the bill concerned President Coolidge;  he voiced his reservations publicly and had to be convinced by Dwight Morrow to offer his support.[21]

            Debate over the naval aviation bill began in the House on 8 April with Butler and Vinson as its principal defenders.  Butler began the presentation by explaining the advantages that a long term program would provide, mainly increased efficiency and effectiveness.  The program received a largely favorable response among the other Representatives, particularly when it was revealed that the program would only cost as much as two new battleships and that new battleships would not be permitted until 1934.  Further, Vinson emphasized that the proposed legislation was primarily an authorization rather than appropriations, Congress would still have the option over the next five years to change its mind about spending the money.[22]

            La Guardia emerged as the bill’s primary antagonist, nitpicking various details at every opportunity.  He questioned the wisdom of committing to such a long term plan when the possibility of creating an independent air service still existed.  Then he ridiculed the idea of Navy officers making wise decisions as to aircraft types.  He also questioned the idea of promising the aircraft industry long term contracts when Congress could still choose not to appropriate the money.  He then attacked the bill for not including an provision for airships, despite Vinson’s acknowledgment that the type could prove useful for scouting.[23]

            Butler and Vinson worked diligently to answer each question that La Guardia posed.  He was not the only opponent however, as a several Congressmen objected on pacifist grounds.  The Washington Naval Conference had encouraged the idea that perhaps war could be avoided in the future and some Congressmen insisted that the United States pursue a unilateral disarmament policy.  Representative Bill Lowrey(D-MS) announced that he could not vote for any military appropriations during peacetime.  He declared:  “Our Nation may not be able to lead the world out of militarism but it will be tragic if we lead it further into militarism.”[24]  He further appealed to his fellow representatives to consider the money that could be saved by eliminating the military expenditures and all of the good work to which the money could be put.

            After the months of hearings by the Lampert Committee and Morrow Board the debate was anticlimactic.  It lasted only four days before H.R. 9690 was put to a vote on 12 April.  The bill passed by a resounding 297 yeas to 40 nays, with 1 present and 93 not voting.  It then moved to the Senate, where it passed without debate and minor changes on 3 June.  The biggest difference in the two bills was the addition of a provision for an additional Assistant Secretary of the Navy for aviation as an amendment rather than as a separate bill as in the House.  After a conference committee ironed out the difference, it was forwarded to President Coolidge who signed the act on 24 June.[25]

            As passed, the Naval Aircraft Expansion Act provided for the procurement of 1,614 aircraft over the next five years.  Under this plan, aircraft would be replaced after three years of service, so that by the end of 1931 the Navy would possess 1,000 operational aircraft.  Total cost was estimated at $85,078,750.  For a year by year breakdown see Table 8 below.

Table 8

Naval Aircraft Expansion Act of 1926[26]

In addition to the airplanes, the Naval Aircraft Expansion Act also authorized the additional Assistant Secretary of the Navy for aeronautics.  President Coolidge appointed Edward P. Warner, a professor of aeronautical engineering at MIT and close friend of Naval Constructor Jerome Hunsaker, to the position.  Warner’s selection assured the new position credibility since it was difficult to question his expertise.

            The Naval Aircraft Expansion Act of 1926 provided stability for the aircraft industry, but did not solve all of its problems.  The act assured the industry regular contracts, but they would still be awarded on a competitive bid basis and did not deal with the question of proprietary rights.  Opponents of the legislation had raised the question during debates, but Butler and Vinson insisted that making such a change was something which needed to be carefully considered by Congress.  Considering the allegations which had arisen under the competitive bid process, dropping the bid process would certainly prove controversial and was something Butler and Vinson preferred to postpone.  Therefore, the actual system of procurement which the industry claimed caused so many problems would continue for the foreseeable future[27]

            The act also reaffirmed Congressional support for the current military structure.  Mitchell and La Guardia had made every attempt to create an independent air service, but they had ultimately failed to persuade Congress that such a change was necessary.  Congress, like the Navy, demonstrated an ingrained conservatism resistant to change.  Without a clear demonstration of a problem which warranted a major restructuring, Congress was unwilling to take the drastic step of creating a new service, or of combining the existing Departments of War and the Navy.  Given the option, Congress preferred to modify the existing system rather than creating a new one.

            Following the contradictory findings of the two groups, Congress chose the more conservative path and left naval aviation under the authority of the Bureau of Aeronautics.  To improve the efficiency of naval aviaiton, Congress created an additional Assistant Secretary of the Navy, one would strictly deal with aviation.  Finally, in order to provide stability for the Navy and the aviation industry, Congress authorized a five year aircraft procurement plan.  Under this plan, the Navy would possess 1,000 planes by 1931 and would replace one-third of them each year, thus insuring that the industry would receive a steady supply of aircraft contracts.