CONCLUSION

            President Coolidge’s signing of the Naval Aircraft Expansion Act of 1926 largely marked the end of the Navy and aircraft industry’s search for stability.  With the passage of the Act, Congress committed itself to the Bureau of Aeronautics and to consistent aircraft purchases for the foreseeable future.  The numbers of aircraft provided for were not great enough to give the Navy the aviation component it desired, nor would the industry see the amount money spent on aviation it sought, both at least could begin long term planning based on reasonable expectations of stable funding.

            Consistency was something which had been lacking since the aviation entered the Navy in 1910.  The new technology had remained in almost a constant state of flux, as had both government funding and the bureaucratic structure of naval aviation for fifteen years.  The Navy had adopted aviation without a clear understanding of how to employ the new technology.  Developing a clear and effective role for aviation took both time and experimentation.  To some extent, this effort was hampered by the First World War which placed its own unique demands on naval aviation and employed it in a different role from the one it would ultimately fulfill.  The Navy did not fully embrace aviation until after the First World War, when it began the development of its first aircraft carrier and full efforts to deploy aircraft with the fleet.

            The First World War damaged the aircraft industry almost as much as it benefited it.  Before the war, the manufacture of aircraft was a cottage industry, producing a few, fairly unique, aircraft per year.  The companies often existed as a subsidiary of another company or as the hobby of the aircraft designer and were not really expected to produce a profit.  The high demand of war attracted additional money and business acumen to the industry and changed it forever.  The collapse of the boom at the end of the war brought on an nearly fatal bust.  Numerous small companies disappeared from aviation and even industry leader the Curtiss Aircraft Company barely survived.  Aviation emerged from the war as a fledgling industry with tremendous potential but an uncertain future.

            Aviation’s disappointing war record continued to haunt the industry after the war.  The public and Congress’ perception of aviation’s failure overshadowed its true accomplishments and in many ways paralleled the developments in other war industries.  From the Navy’s experience, attempts to construct sufficient numbers of anti-submarine vessels proved remarkably similar to aircraft.  When the Navy realized a need for large numbers of anti-submarine craft and multiple individuals, namely Henry Ford, introduced proposals for the mass production of these ships.  Like with aviation, these grandiose plans faltered when confronted with the realities of wartime conditions.  Ford’s plan to mass produce Eagle boats yielded but three boats before the war ended because of production difficulties.  The war ended before the full weight of American industry could be brought to bear on Germany.[1]

            Unlike established defense industries such as shipbuilding, aviation lacked influence in Congress.  While individual Congressmen, such as Fiorella La Guardia, emerged as strong supporters of the technology and the industry, the majority remained largely apathetic.  Few Congressmen understood aircraft or the potential of airpower many simply opposed the idea of spending additional money on aviation.  Others openly questioned the wisdom of wasting money on an industry which had failed to deliver on promises made during the war. 

            The Navy and Congress seemed willing to continue on an undefined course after the war.  The Navy wanted to continue the divided system for cognizance for aviation, with the various bureaus sharing responsibility and no clear director.  Congress voiced no clear objection, appeared ready to return funding levels to pre-war levels, and had placed few expectations for naval aviation’s development.  General William Mitchell’s public campaign for an independent air service forced both the Navy and Congress to take additional actions.

            The Navy agreed to the establishment of the Bureau of Aeronautics as the minimum adjustment necessary to meet Mitchell’s criticisms and block his plan for an independent air force.  Congress agreed to the new bureau principally because of its perceived efficiency.  The money it would save rather than any increase in the Navy’s effectiveness justified the bureaus creation.  This change satisfied the Navy and Congress, but again the public allegations made by Mitchell and his supporters attracted attention and forced a public airing of opinion and grievances.

            The individuals who testified before both the Lampert Committee and the Morrow Board offered very little new or revolutionary information.  Instead, the various sides in the debate attempted to explain their positions not only to Congress but also to the nation as a whole.  To accomplish this, many of the witnesses distinctly slanted the relevant facts to support their view, as evidenced by the widely varied claims as to the number of quality aircraft possessed by the United States.  In particular, the experience of the Royal Air Force in Great Britain was used by both General Mitchell and the Navy to further support for and opposition to the creation of an independent air service. 

            Congress’ ultimate decision to reject the creation of an independent air force and instead invest long term in the existing structure reflected the body’s inherent conservatism.  Radical change required radical circumstances and too many influential leaders, such as President Calvin Coolidge, Secretary of the Navy Curtis Wilbur, and influential member of the House Naval Affairs Committee Carl Vinson, strongly opposed the creation of a new service or the removal of aviation from the Navy’s control.  The creation of an additional Assistant Secretary of the Navy for aviation addressed the allegations that the Navy had not sufficiently embraced aviation, while the promise of future aircraft purchases reassured the industry.

            In reality, the Naval Aircraft Expansion Act of 1926 represented very little commitment from Congress.  While authorizing the purchase of aircraft for the foreseeable future by allowing the Navy to replace one-third of its 1,000 plane force every year, it did not include any actual appropriations.  Vinson and the Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics Admiral William Moffett would have to lobby Congress each year for money to procure the authorized aircraft.  They proved successful in this difficult task, and by 30 June 1931 the Navy did indeed posses 1,000 aircraft.[2] 

            These aircraft gave the Navy a credible air component in comparison to other nations, but meant even more to the aircraft industry.  Consistent contracts allowed aircraft companies to make rational decisions about future construction and investment.  The civilian market continued to improve during the second half of the decade, but did not reach the heights envisioned by many supporters until 1950s.  For a complete breakdown of military, civilian, and export orders see Table 9 below.

Table 9

U.S. Aircraft Production, 1925-1931[3]

The U.S. aircraft column largely represents aircraft sold to some portion of the United States government other than the military, the Post Office for instance.  Therefore the United States government remained the industry’s primary customer, accounting for nearly 95% of all orders through the Second World War, because both the civilian and foreign markets failed to develop.  With a stable level of government procurement assured, new companies survived the decade and even prospered.  In 1932 Glenn Martin felt confident enough of the industry’s future to move his company from Cleveland to Baltimore and construct a new $30,000,000 factory despite the ongoing Great Depression.[4]

The companies which benefited from the Naval Aircraft Expansion Act of 1926, such as the Douglas Aircraft Company, the Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation, and the Chance-Vought Corporation, formed the backbone of naval aircraft production during the Second World War.  They produced these aircraft in conjunction with the Bureau of Aeronautics, which continued to control the Navy’s aviation throughout the war and may be credited in large part for the Navy’s success.  Together, the Navy and the industry developed a revolutionary new technology of war, not through careful planning but through continuous contention and debate with a great deal of input from outside interests who had their own visions of aviation’s future.