INTRODUCTIONa

            This study of the introduction of a new technology into an existing bureaucracy demonstrates the complex interaction among competing interests in developing defense procurement policy and illustrates the role of that policy in supporting new and developing industries.  Institutionalizing the procurement of aircraft for the Navy affected not only the Navy’s bureaucratic structure but also the developing aviation industry which relied on government contracts for stability and continued growth.  Congress, as the ultimate source of funding and authority, also expressed interest in the process and hence, procuring the new technology became a matter of public debate rather than simply a question of bureaucratic reorganization.  Ultimately, procurement policy evolved as a compromise among the multiple stakeholders and served to adequately meet the needs of the Navy and the aviation industry.

            Traditionally a conservative institution resistant to change and technological innovation, the United States Navy initially rejected aviation despite successful heavier than air flights as early as 1903.[1]  Aircraft procurement on an experimental basis did not begin until 1911, by which time many European powers were already spending millions of dollars per year on aviation.[2]  Initially, the Navy rejected two proposed significant changes in its bureaucratic structure, the creation of a Bureau of Aeronautics and the establishment of a separate aviation corps, and instead divided the duties among existing bureaus, including Navigation, Ordnance, Construction and Repair, and Steam Engineering, with a single officer assigned to advise and coordinate them. Originally Captain Washington I. Chambers filled this position as head of the Aviation Desk in the Bureau of Navigation the position changed names and location seven times before 1919 when it became the Aviation Section in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.[3]

This system proved barely sufficient for the limited number of aircraft procured before American entry into the First World War.  Wartime requirements, however, exposed the limitations of this system and America’s aviation industry, as the country lagged behind Europe in both production capacity and aircraft quality.[4]  Despite U.S. naval aviation’s successes during the war and immediately afterwards, notably the NC-4 transatlantic flight in 1919, it was clear that the existing procurement system had to be modified to meet increased demand, provide greater stability, and become more efficient.  The Navy conducted an internal review from 1919 through 1921 in the form of hearings before the General Board, the Navy’s primary advisory body, which helped determine not only procurement but also general aviation policy for the Navy.

The internal Navy evaluation occurred concurrently with Congressional investigations.  The first, which focused on the overall performance of the Navy during the First World War, resulted from a series of criticisms by Vice Admiral William S. Sims, Commander and Chief of American Naval Forces in Europe during the war.  At the same time another series of hearings focused more directly on aviation procurement and fiscal matters, primarily in three areas:  wartime expenditures, post-war aviation policy, and continued development of the nation’s aviation industry.  Allegations of excessive profiteering and inadequate or defective material first focused attention on wartime expenditures.  The necessity of avoiding a repetition of these problems and a desire to reduce defense expenditures, fueled Congressional interest in post-war aviation policy.  Finally, Congress considered it to be in the country’s interest to develop a strong aviation industry and received convincing testimony that government support was necessary to achieve this goal.[5]

The aviation industry displayed equal interest in the Navy’s aviation procurement policy since from its inception the industry had relied heavily on defense contracts.  Wartime demand had brought rapid expansion of existing companies and the creation of new ones, but post-war prospects looked bleak when an anticipated boom in commercial aviation failed to materialize, defense contracts rapidly declined with little hope for future growth until the surplus of aircraft purchased during the war was expended, and the military dumped many of its surplus aircraft onto the open market, further eroding prices. [6]  Hence the aviation industry pushed for long term stability in procurement to support the industry and make it possible for American companies to compete against subsidized European firms.[7]

            Spurred by the threat from supporters of an independent, unified air force, led by Army Brigadier General William Mitchell, the Navy created the Bureau of Aeronautics in 1921.[8]  While this change solved many of the problems for the Navy, public debate continued until 1925 on the future of military aviation in general.  In that year public pressure and a series of aviation mishaps lead to a Congressional inquiry, the Lampert committee, which resulted more in posturing by interested parties than conclusive results.[9]  Concerned at the direction of Congressional inquiry, President Calvin Coolidge appointed a panel of respected experts, headed by Dwight Morrow, to recommend aviation policy for the nation.  Hearings before this “President’s Aircraft Board” provided a forum for the debate, at which all parties could express opinions.  The recommendations of this board confirmed the continued existence of naval aviation under the Navy’s control, including the creation of an Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Aviation and the Bureau of Aeronautics as the principal body of procurement.[10]  Based on this report, the Navy then secured authorization for the first five year procurement plan in 1926, which established naval aviation strength at one thousand planes by 1931 and provided for the purchase of more than three hundred aircraft on an annual basis thereafter, finally bringing stability to the aviation industry.[11]

            Considering the importance of naval aviation in the Second World War, its development in the inter-war years receives scant attention in modern historiography with the question of procurement, other than lighter than air, being largely ignored.  Histories of naval aviation, such as those by Roscoe and Turnbull and Lord, address the topic predominantly in the context of the Billy Mitchell controversy.[12]  Trimble and Melhorn have both prepared works on related topics, the Naval Aircraft Factory and the rise of the aircraft carrier respectively, with Trimble, and others such as Reynolds, also focusing on leading aviators of the period.[13]  Several works on early development in the aviation industry, either in terms of individual companies or the industry as a whole, exist but do not directly address the question of naval procurement or its organization, instead focusing primarily on the aircraft produced.  A notable exception is Vander Meulen’s The Politics of Aircraft which looks at the industry’s relationship with Congress but focuses predominantly on Army policy.[14]  No other work attempts to address the influence of the three major interests in a single work and assess their impact on naval aviation procurement.

            Studies exist on other aspects of naval procurement, such as naval vessels and submarines by Coolidge and Weir respectively, but aviation remains uncovered.[15]  This lack of attention to the procurement of aircraft suggests a dearth of material but that appearance is deceiving.  The General Board Hearings, 1917-1950, are available on microfilm, as are the Annual Report of the Bureau of Aeronautics in the Secretary of the Navy’s Annual Reports.  Both of these provide insight into the Navy’s decision making on the matter which is supported by the Navy’s World War II “Administrative History Series.”  The Congressional Record and various Congressional hearings, including those of the Lampert committee, chronicle the debate in Congress.  The four volumes of the Morrow Board hearings give a comprehensive view of all opinions.  This material is supported by articles in the New York Times, Philadelphia Post, general and professional journals including the Naval Institute Proceedings and Scientific American, and numerous secondary sources on related naval, business, and technology topics.  The only glaring weakness in primary source material exists in the area of corporate records, most of which do not exist or are not available, but testimony before Congress and other bodies by industry representatives provides the necessary insight.[16]

            This study will fill the gaps in the historiography by drawing on these materials to demonstrate the interaction between competing interests in developing aviation procurement policy for the Navy.  The Navy’s policy evolved to satisfy the military needs of the Navy, the business needs of the aviation industry, and the general interests of Congress.  The policy which resulted from this process remained in effect until at least the beginning of World War II, providing long term growth to naval aviation and the aviation industry.